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THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COVENANT

English rendition as published in

*Basic Political Documents of the
Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement*

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The following is the complete and unabridged text of the Palestinian National Covenant, as published officially, in English, by the PLO.

The Israel Information Centre is taking the unusual step of reproducing and distributing this hostile document in order to give the interested reader an opportunity to draw his own conclusions concerning its message.

It should be borne in mind that the geographical unit called Palestine includes the entire area of the present-day State of Israel, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the territory in dispute between them. Thus, the "liberation of Palestine" espoused by the Covenant actually means the eradication of Israel — and, eventually, of Jordan as well — as an independent state.

This, indeed, is the central goal of the organization which has adopted the Covenant as its official Charter — the "Palestine Liberation Organization," known as the PLO.

Articles of the Covenant

Article 1: Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.

Article 2: Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3: The Palestinian people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will.

Article 4: The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential and inherent characteristic; it is transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership of the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them.

Article 5: The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father — whether inside Palestine or outside it — is also a Palestinian.

Article 6: The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.

Article 7: That there is a Palestinian community and that it has material, spiritual and historical connections with Palestine are indisputable facts. It is a national duty to bring up individual Palestinians in an Arab revolutionary manner. All means of information and education must be adopted in order to acquaint the Palestinian with his country in the most profound manner, both spiritual and material, that is possible. He must be prepared for the armed struggle and ready to sacrifice his wealth and his life in order to win back his homeland and bring about its liberation.

Article 8: The phase in their history, through which the Palestinian people are now living, is that of national (*watani*) struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Thus the conflicts among the Palestinian national forces are secondary, and should be ended for the sake of the basic conflict that exists between the forces of Zionism and of imperialism on the one hand, and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis the Palestinian masses, regardless of whether they are residing in the national homeland or in diaspora (*mahajir*) constitute — both their organization and the individuals — one national front working for the retrieval of Palestine and its liberation through armed struggle.

Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.

Article 10: Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness and mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires the achieving of unity for the national (*watani*) struggle among the different groupings of the Palestinian people, and between the Palestinian people and the Arab masses so as to secure the continuation of the revolution, its escalation and victory.

Article 11: The Palestinians will have three mottoes: national (*wataniyya*) unity, national (*qawmiyya*) mobilization and liberation.

Article 12: The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to contribute their share towards the attainment of that objective, however, they must, at the present stage of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that identity, and oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it.

Article 13: Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine; the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and work towards the realization of one objective proceeds side by side with work towards the realization of the other.

Article 14: The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence itself, depends upon the destiny of the Palestinian cause. From this interdependence springs the Arab nation's pursuit of, and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The people of Palestine play the role of the vanguard in the realization of this sacred national (*qawmi*) goal.

Article 15: The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national (*qawmi*) duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab nation — peoples and governments — with the Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, human, and moral and spiritual capabilities to participate actively with the Palestinian people in the liberation of Palestine. It must, particularly in the phase of the armed Palestinian revolution, offer and furnish the Palestinian people with all possible help, and material and human support, and make available to them the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to carry out their leading role in the armed revolution, until they liberate their homeland.

Article 16: The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual point of view, will provide the Holy Land with an atmosphere of safety and tranquility, which in turn will safeguard the country's religious sanctuaries and guarantee freedom of worship and of visit to all, without discrimination of race, colour, language, or religion. Accordingly, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

Article 17: The liberation of Palestine, from a human point of view, will restore to the Palestinian individual his dignity, pride and freedom. Accordingly the Palestinian Arab people look forward to the support of all those who believe in the dignity of man and his freedom in the world.

Article 18: The liberation of Palestine, from an international point of view, is a defensive action necessitated by the demands of self-

defence. Accordingly, the Palestinian people, desirous as they are of the friendship of all people, look to freedom-loving, justice-loving and peace-loving states for support in order to restore their legitimate rights in Palestine, to re-establish peace and security in the country, and to enable its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.

Article 19: The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the State of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right to self-determination.

Article 20: The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine and everything that has been based upon them, are deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong.

Article 21: The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine and reject all proposals aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization.

Article 22: Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and a geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant source of threat *vis-a-vis* peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Since the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and will contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for the support of all the progressive and peaceful forces and urge them all, irrespective of their affiliations and beliefs, to offer the Palestinian people all aid and support in their just struggle for the liberation of their homeland.

Article 23: The demands of security and peace, as well as the demands of right and justice, require all states to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement, to outlaw its existence, and to ban its operations, in order that friendly relations among peoples may be preserved, and the loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safeguarded.

Article 24: The Palestinian people believe in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity, and in the right of all peoples to exercise them.

Article 25: For the realization of the goals of this Charter and its principles, the Palestine Liberation Organization will perform its role in the liberation of Palestine in accordance with the Constitution of this Organization.

Article 26: The Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, is responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its struggle — to retrieve its homeland, liberate and return to it and exercise the right to self-determination in it — in all military, political and financial fields and also for whatever may be required by the Palestinian case on the inter-Arab and international levels.

Article 27: The Palestinian Liberation Organization shall cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its potentialities; and will adopt a neutral policy among them in the light of the requirements of the war of liberation; and on this basis it shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab State.

Article 28: The Palestinian Arab people assert the genuineness and independence of their national (*wataniyya*) revolution and reject all forms of intervention, trusteeship and subordination.

Article 29: The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and retrieve their homeland. The Palestinian people determine their attitude towards all states and forces on the basis of the stands they adopt *vis-a-vis* the Palestinian case and the extent of the support they offer to the Palestinian revolution to fulfill the aims of the Palestinian people.

Article 30: Fighters and carriers of arms in the war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army which will be the protective force for the gains of the Palestinian Arab people.

Article 31: The Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance and an anthem. All this shall be decided upon in accordance with a special regulation.

Article 32: Regulations, which shall be known as the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization, shall be annexed to this Charter. It shall lay down the manner in which the Organization, and its organs and institutions, shall be constituted; the respective competence of each; and the requirements of its obligations under the Charter.

Article 33: This Charter shall not be amended save by (vote of) a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization (taken) at a special session convened for that purpose.



Lebanon: Bound and Battered

LIFE UNDER THE PLO

"Pray for the welfare of the government," counsels a Jewish proverb, "for were it not for the fear of it, men would swallow each other alive." There is no better demonstration of the perils of non-government than the condition of Southern Lebanon prior to Israel's entrance into the area last month. A visit to the largest population centers in the area and conversations with their inhabitants reveal a picture of years of chaos, lack of central authority, civilian suffering, and Mafia-like rule by Palestinian militia organizations.

"Relations with the Palestinian organizations were based on fear and economic interest," says Adnan Ibrahim, Lebanese governor of the Nabatiyeh district in Southern Lebanon. He cites numerous cases of expropriation of property by the Palestinian organizations, commandeering of cars, and forceful occupation of homes, which were used as ammunition depots and headquarters by the some 30 Palestinian organizations which operated in Nabatiyeh. According to Ibrahim and other Nabatiyans, armed threats and monetary incentives were the way the Palestinian militias elicited the cooperation of the local residents. "Every family here has a story," said some young men waiting near the governor's office.

Ibrahim himself had his house taken over by a PLO commander, Shehade Marzuk, who lived in it with his family. A visit to the building reveals a partially-damaged structure which Ibrahim had left in previous years during the fighting between the PLO and the Christian militias of Major Sa'ad Haddad. The Arabic scrawl and crude map of Palestine painted on the walls

indicate that the building was held by the "Arab Struggle Front", ammunition crates, military equipment and debris litter the site.

"The Palestinians violated the rights of the citizens, and felt they were superior to them," says Ibrahim. With the absence of local government, law courts, or police, "the law of force was the only one in existence." A local leader of the Shi'ite "Amal" militia echoed the same sentiments. "The Palestinians were the reason for everyone's suffering," he said, "and were a great burden on Lebanon."

The same picture of general insecurity and fear repeats itself in Sidon, where more than 30 armed Palestinian organizations operated. Slogans and posters on many of the town's buildings bear witness to their once-pervasive presence.

Confiscations, Thefts and Shoot-Outs

Dr. Ramzi Shabb, director of Sidon's Shabb Hospital, described a situation where the lack of official authority compelled people to turn to the strongest armed force in the town — the PLO — in order to ensure their safety. "Many people here were not really Palestinian fighters, but belonged to a Palestinian organization in order to gain protection against blackmail from other PLO factions; their bearing of arms was really for self-defense," Shabb said.

According to Shabb, the behavior of the PLO and their allied militias slipped out of control of their leadership. Shabb himself had his family's agricultural land confiscated by the PLO and was compelled to subscribe to its journals. "They



would ask you to subscribe, and you couldn't say no," he said. He also related stories of extensive car thefts in the town — by PLO and local people alike — and shoot-outs in the streets between rival armed factions. "People didn't like to walk around, because there could have been fighting at any time."

In such chaos, many arrangements had to be made with the help of personal intervention by an influential person. Shabb was forced to have recourse to such persons. Generally, he said, "the PLO was the government. We had to go to somebody, ultimate authority was with the Kalashnikov (Russian-made machine-gun) and they had it."

Functioning as the strongest force in Sidon, the PLO was able to grant protection to various people. It even opened its own hospital, and treated local residents there along with their own people. Shabb's wife told of witnessing gunfights in front of the Red Crescent Hospital between rival Palestinian factions fighting over admission of their wounded for treatment.

Shabb's wife told of an artificial economic boom in Sidon, brought on by PLO wages paid to the local employees who worked in its burgeoning administration, in road repair, in UNRWA, and in other projects in Sidon and its refugee camps. Men could earn as much as 50 Lebanese pounds a day (according to a resident of Tyre) for bearing arms for the Palestinian militias. According to the Shabbs, all this created a rising income level which affected Lebanese and Palestinian alike. "Lebanese grew wealthier; most of the expensive jewelry sales were to Palestinians."

According to Shabb, the Ein Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon was far from a poor area. Its residents did not pay local taxes or utility bills, many owned Mercedes cars and enjoyed a high standard of living. There was apparently some competition between Lebanese and Palestinians in Sidon for jobs, and PLO support usually helped secure these jobs for Palestinians. One indication of the artificial boom caused by the presence of the PLO is the five-fold decline in vegetable prices which occurred

in the town shortly following Israel's entry.

Civilians Used as Cover for PLO

According to the Shabbs, the PLO made use of any structure they could obtain — U.N.-owned or otherwise — for their military purposes. They were astounded to discover after the war that 10 tons of plastic T N T had been stored in a basement near their hospital. A huge arms cache was also found in the city's central square. The Shabbs say there was no way of knowing the full extent of explosives stored under residential struc-

PLO ATROCITIES COME TO LIGHT

Finally freed from the tyranny of the PLO, residents of Southern Lebanon are slowly beginning to reveal the atrocities that the terrorists committed against the local population.

In Sidon this week army officers were led by residents to a building in the *casbah* (market) which had been used by the terrorists to incarcerate anybody they suspected of being against the PLO or collaborating with the Israelis. The makeshift jail was also used by the terrorists to gang-rape young Lebanese girls who had been kidnapped from their homes.

Witnesses told the Israeli officials that the terrorists packed as many as 13 to 15 "suspects" into small windowless rooms, and some of the prisoners were reportedly kept in these conditions for several years. The torture methods the terrorists used included passing smoldering pieces of coals over the prisoners' bodies, ripping out their fingernails or locking them in small cupboards.

The office in the jail, which contained one bed, was used by the terrorists to gang-rape 14 to 15-year-old girls who had been kidnapped by the terrorists. Their shouts and screams for nights on end could be heard all over the district, but the local residents were too frightened to intervene. Many of the girls are reportedly pregnant now.

COVER STORY



One of the PLO's worst outrages occurred in the town of Damour, south of Beirut, at the beginning of Lebanon's so-called "civil war" when the terrorists captured the city, slaughtered its surviving residents, including women and children and subsequently built it up as one of their major bases. They also used the church (the tall steeple in the background) for arms storage, for training and as a shooting gallery. The town was badly damaged again, as seen from this photo, in house-to-house fighting between Israeli troops and the terrorists. With the town's liberation by Israel, Christian residents are beginning to trickle back.



As local Lebanese officials look on, Joseph Emil, priest to the Christian community in the former PLO-dominated town of Nabatiye, presents a plaque of appreciation to Col. Zvi Al-Peleg (right) and Major Avi Fehen, in charge of assistance to the civilian population, for their efforts helping rehabilitate the war-torn district.

tures, and even when this was known, it was in no one's power to prevent such storage. A number of agreements had been reached to facilitate the removal of the ammunition from these sites, but they were never kept by the PLO. Palestinian anti-aircraft guns were positioned on the roof of Sidon's Protestant Evangelical school and near hospitals, despite the objections of local residents. "Your life is no better than mine," was an answer given to Mrs. Shabb when she protested one such deployment.

Rape, Mutilation and Murder

At the IDF Civil Aid Unit in Sidon, which coordinates aid activity for Southern Lebanon, one can hear the more grisly stories of PLO victimization of the local population. These stories are communicated to the Israeli authorities by Lebanese who have suffered at the hands of the Palestinian militias, and evidence is piling up daily of Palestinian atrocities against local civilians.

Civil Aid Officer Lt. Col. Na'aman Livnat painted a picture of a population living in constant fear of Palestinian military violence, which included sniping into flats, raping and mutilation of women, and murder. The stories related by Livnat and

his colleagues demonstrate what could happen to anyone who got on the wrong side of the Palestinian organizations: nuns were raped at a convent near Sidon, a Dr. Najj from Jezine reported that a woman giving birth in his clinic was mocked and humiliated by Palestinian militiamen, a man was dismembered alive after his limbs had been tied to moving cars, children in Sidon were sniped at while playing football, a mother and her daughters were repeatedly raped, and the mother finally mutilated by armed Palestinians. The list goes on.

Anarchy

Col. Zvi Al-Peleg, commander of the Civil Aid Unit for Southern Lebanon, relates: "There was no government here, no central authority, each group had its force. The Sunni Moslems may have been more in favor of the PLO, but talk to them now: the PLO oppressed all of them, no one would dare leave his house after sunset. When I imposed a curfew, I wanted to apologize to the local leaders - but was told that they had been living under a self-imposed curfew anyway. Now, they say, they can leave their cars and homes unlocked, there is a general feeling of renewed security. Before, soldiers of the Lebanese army wouldn't dare leave their base in uniform, for fear of kidnapping, beatings, or assassination by local militias."

Al-Peleg riffled through a sheaf of written appeals he has been receiving from people throughout Southern Lebanon, requesting redress for the maltreatment they had suffered. "The sheikh of Ansar, who refused to comply with a demand that he express support for the Palestinian revolution in his Friday sermon, had his 16-year-old daughter raped. Other people have had family members murdered and their property confiscated," he says. "We have many cases of this."

Similar incidents were reported in the coastal town of Tyre where there were some 1,500 armed Palestinians. Those suffering most at their hands were apparently the Christians, as evidenced by the story of one local Christian woman who was held for some hours by 25 armed men who suspected her of ties with the Phalangists, after she had traveled to Beirut to visit her sister. The woman told of the humiliation of both men and women the midnight rifling of Christian homes and threatening letters. According to this woman, only Christians in Tyre suffered this treatment, the local Moslems were on good terms with the Palestinian militias.

In a conversation with Maronite bishop Khoury of Tyre, the bishop denied that the Christians of the town had been per-

PLO ATROCITIES: "LEBANON IS FULL OF ORADOURS"

French President Francois Mitterrand's recent warning that an Israeli assault on West Beirut could lead to another Oradour (when Nazi troops murdered some 600 French civilians in a church in Oradour-sur-Glane in June 1944) caused undisguised disgust among Israelis, who angrily rejected the application of this epitome of Nazi atrocities to Israeli actions.

In Southern Lebanon itself, however, many civilians are coming forward with tales of a multitude of "Oradours" that the PLO terrorists committed against the local population.

John Nasser, the local priest in the Christian village of Ayshiyeh, near Jezine, told *Ma'ariv* reporter Aharon Dolav this week of just one such atrocity.

On October 19, 1976, about 1,000 armed terrorists stormed into his town, whose citizens were suspected of co-operating with Israel. They broke into the houses, rounded up 100 families and hustled them into the church, where they

secuted on religious grounds by the PLO, saying that this only happened if they were suspected of having ties with the Phalangists. The bishop reported initial PLO suspicion of his activities, which later disappeared when the humanitarian nature of his activities was understood. Khoury related that his only political contact with the PLO was his urging of its leaders to change their policies, which were leading them to what he considered a "dead end."

According to Capt. Ezra Habas of the IDF's Tyre Civil Aid Unit, one can hear criticism of the Palestinian militias among the Palestinians themselves. "Palestinians who left the refugee camps and wanted no connection with the past or with the PLO were often forced by the Palestinian organizations to donate money under threat of violence. Habas reported that the PLO had taken over a Lebanese army hospital in Tyre, and that it had converted a nearby school into a headquarters and training camp for 11 to 15-year-old boys.

Amidst the general anarchy Lebanon also became the arena for large-scale Palestinian economic activity. Habas, who studied the subject, said there was one Palestinian millionaire who had built a housing complex in the region, with choice apartments going to members of the PLO elite. Land belonging to the Lebanese government was confiscated, and sold for profit by Palestinian organizations. Sidon was the center of an international company, Elico, headed by a Palestinian named Daud Ali, which marketed "everything," according to Habas, including building materials — and which did an annual business amounting to millions of dollars.

PLO Protected Palestinians

Further confirmation of the picture of Palestinian militia control of life in the major Southern Lebanese towns was given by a self-styled anarchist student from Tyre, a former PLO supporter. According to the student, the PLO did indeed run parts of the town Mafia-style, in the absence of a central authority. A PLO man named Shahadiye controlled the Tyre port, while some businesses paid protection money to ensure their safety. The student says the Palestinian militias ran drug and prostitution rings, and their local leader acted "like an Ottoman governor."


PLO support gave persons added prestige and facilitated their business transactions, while poorer Palestinians benefited from employment with the PLO, earning 50 pounds (\$10) a day, according to the student. The payment of these salaries was a

locked them up and guarded them with cocked guns. Sixty-five of the inhabitants were kept outside. Over the next few hours, the hostages in the church heard the regular sound of gunfire.

After two days the terrorists released the hostages, who stepped out of the church to be met with the sight of the bodies of the 65 murdered villagers lying in pools of blood on the street.

The 49-year-old Nassar, who counted two brothers and 15 cousins among the 65 victims, told Dolav bitterly, "Ayshiyeh is my Oradour. Lebanon is full of Oradours. The story must be told. The world must be informed."

This is one of the many atrocity stories that have surfaced in the wake of the Israeli liberation of Southern Lebanon from terrorist control. According to Col. Zvi Al-Peleg, commander of the Civilian Aid Unit for Southern Lebanon, "a black book of PLO crimes is now being compiled." His assistant, Maj. Avi Farhan, relates that "five thousand people have voluntarily come forward, so far, to give eye-witness accounts of PLO atrocities," in the hope of putting the perpetrators on trial.



٢. ملاحظة اخرى:
 • الملاحظة:
 تشكل المناطق البنية في خريطة صيدا والقمر، المحيطة بها مناطق مغطاة بشكل جيد من الامساك وتوفر المكانية الاغلاء والتجوه للالاء والامراء بشكل كامل (تقريبا) ما هذا موقع (١٨١) احداني (٢٨٤-٣٧١٦) موقع (٦٤٣) احداني (٣٧١٤-٢٨٢) وموقع ١٢٧ احداني (٢٨٢-٣٧١٢) حيث تتقدم القذافي في هذه التلال هذا ما تاذر من بنائها تلبية.

The PLO not only used civilian facilities as a cover for their military positions as indicated (above) by captured document ("The built up areas of Sidon and the villages surrounding the city are excellent cover zones") but were also indiscriminate in the blind shelling of their Christian opponents, as shown (top) in photo of a damaged hospital in Baabda, the Christian-dominated suburb of Beirut.

source of strength and a means of influence for the PLO.

Reactions from Palestinians in Tyre's Bas refugee camp to the PLO were mixed. Along with complaints of inadequate wages and housing supplied by the PLO, there was the assertion that "they protected us." According to one teenager, one could find some Palestinians who were satisfied with the ejection of the Palestinian militias from the camps, and some who were not. One woman criticized the PLO leadership which had been sitting in Beirut, "while we got bombed here." Though sometimes bitter, this Palestinian reaction to the PLO was not hostile, and conspicuously lacked stories of atrocities and maltreatment heard from Christian and other Lebanese and reported by IDF officers.

The apparent reason for the previous general ignorance of PLO maltreatment of the population in Lebanon may lie in the feeling of helplessness among the victimized population. According to Al-Peleg and his colleagues in the Civil Aid Unit, many persons maltreated by the PLO were too terrorized and frightened to complain or report their plight. Conversations with Lebanese showed a pervasive sense that it would have been of no use to complain, there was no central government or effective police force to which to appeal, and the Palestinian militias were not likely to respond favorably to any protest. Media access to the region from other parts of Lebanon may also have been hampered in the past.

Officers in the Sidon Civil Aid Unit reported that a Turkish journalist who visited them recently told them that it had been the first time he had ever been able to drive non-stop to Sidon from Beirut without encountering repeated militia road-blocks on the way.

TERRORISM

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For years the Israelis suspected, searched painstakingly for proof, alerted others. Now they are certain both written and live evidence has fallen into their hands in the course of their Lebanon 'blitz' on the PLO. And even the most seasoned military experts are stunned: Lebanon has been — and, as long as West Beirut is in PLO hands, remains — the mecca of world terrorism.

"Lebanon to the PLO has been unique and priceless, it has enabled them to build up an infrastructure unhindered in a territory that only they controlled," says a high-ranking Israeli source who does not wish to be identified.

Among the many documents seized in South Lebanon was a diary of a PLO training command near Tyre, for the period April-July 1981. It reads as follows. "1. An African group of 10, from Malawi, has arrived (June 11). 2. A course for our comrades from Malawi has begun (June 23). 3. Comrades from South Africa have left (May 16). 4. Final exams for comrades from El Salvador. 5. Abu Hand in Damascus (?) 6. A course for comrades from Haiti has begun (April 6). 7. A group of five comrades from Turkey has arrived (June 4). 8. Their course has be-



Charred skeleton of the "blood bus" attacked by terrorists in March 1978 on Tel Aviv's coastal road, resulting in 33 dead and 82 wounded

FIRST PROOFS OF PLO'S INTERNATIONAL CONNECTION

PLO SHOPS IN EAST GERMANY

Among the documents seized from the PLO is a detailed report of a Palestinian military mission to East Germany. Received by the East German deputy defense ministry and chief of staff, the PLO delegation was given red carpet treatment on their six days of touring and discussions within the Eastern bloc country.

The Palestinian delegation apparently traveled to East Germany with a dual mission in mind. Preparations for a group of PLO soldiers to be trained within the East German army were finalized. And, secondly, they were on a shopping spree for East German armaments.

Transcripts of the conversations reveal that the proposed military training program included the following elements: political indoctrination, technical, tactical and physical training, plus courses in math, physics and the German language.

At one point an East German officer confronted the Palestinians with, "The Marxist-Leninist doctrine serves as the basis for all training. Do you have any objection to this?" The unequivocal Palestinian answer, "Absolutely not!"

One of the chief Palestinian con-

cerns is a fear that their soldiers will be segregated from the rest of the East German trainees, because training is carried out in German and not Arabic. When the Palestinians request the number of trainees be increased "to strengthen the PLO ties with the (East) German army as well as with the German people," East German efficiency reigns supreme. "Basically, no changes will be made in the number of trainees or in the training program," the officer replies. "Requests to learn additional skills should be referred to the Soviet Union."

On Day Four the Palestinian diary shows discussions were held with the East German export agency. Although there are no records in the document of how expensive the Palestinian shopping spree proved, the East German inventory list reveals a well-stocked store of munitions. Available at bargain basement prices are: 36 per anti-aircraft shell in quantities of 51,000 and ammunition for 57mm artillery pieces at \$29 per anti-tank shell in quantities of 12,000.

"Part of the order can be received immediately," the East Germans assured their clients, "and part within four weeks of establishment of credit line at the bank." And, for the PLO there was a special deal — the east Germans were prepared to give them a two percent discount on the total bill.

gun (June 8) 9. Their course has ended (July 4) 10. The group of our comrades from Turkey has left us (July 6) "

Another document found, a kind of "World Directory of Terror Organizations" lists for January 1, 1981, the PLO's foreign 'associates' and partners: Italy (Red Brigades), Japan (Jap Red Army), West Germany (Baader Meinhof 'Red Army' faction), Ireland (Irish Republican Army), Turkey (Turkish Popular Liberation Army), Holland ('Red Help'), Eritrea (Eritrean Liberation Front), and The Liberation of Armenia.

Also included are Corsica (FLNC), Brazil (Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria), Argentina (Montenaros), Colombia (Colombia Guerilla group), Chile (MIR), Nicaragua (Sandinistas (Now in Power), U.S. (Black Panthers), Guatemala (MR-13), Bolivia (ELN), Uruguay (Tupamaros and MLN), Salvador (underground movements), Portugal (International Workers Organization), and the Gulf States (Front for the Liberation of the Conquered Gulf). Unlike other international directories, no addresses or telephone numbers are given for the member organizations.

But the PLO itself has, of course, offices — or, to be more precise, had offices until very recently — in South Lebanon, and still retains them in West Beirut, complete with listed and unlisted telephone numbers, telex machines, and radio com-

NEWSVIEW JULY 27, 1982

munications equipment.

"The PLO serves as a hub of international terrorism, ranging from extreme left to radical right-wing underground movements, states an Israeli expert in this particular field. Apart from serving their own narrow interests, cooperation among the subversive groups is generally based upon a common ideological commitment to either 'the struggle against imperialism, Zionism, and capitalism', or to the concept of anarchy and world revolution." The principal theatres of international terrorist activity are Western Europe, Latin America, Japan, such Middle-Eastern countries as Turkey and the Gulf states, and East and South Africa."

Their support is on a grand scale and comes from the Gulf Oil states and the Soviet Union and its allies, with the backing of various extreme Arab governments. Legitimate or forged passports are provided and, with the help of diplomatic pouches, PLO agents communicate and move freely throughout the world.

We have scores of Turks in our hands, captured in Lebanon," says an IDF officer, recalling Prime Minister Menachem Begin's disclosure of 26 Turks taken. "Some of those are what we call mercenaries, perhaps even most. They joined the PLO because they wanted to earn their bread, and escaped from Turkey to find a living. They found themselves fighting the Israelis without even understanding what it is all about or why. But others served even as officers with the PLO."

The PLO signed agreements with their foreign associates. For instance, arms intended for the African National Congress in South Africa were consigned

МИНИСТЕРСТВО ОБОРОНЫ СССР СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВО АН № 13765 Настоящее свидетельство выдано Капитану Абду-Азизу Махмуду Абу-Реддау в том, что он в октябре 1975 поступил и в марте 1976 окончил 1 Высший Офицерские курсы, Восток по специальности: командир пе- хотинного батальона Настоящее свидетельство дает право на самостоятельное выполнение работ, связан- ных с получением специальности Исполнитель: И. И. И. Подпись: И. И. И. Дата: 16 марта 1976 г. Регистрация № 3012/140	THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, USSR CERTIFICATE АН № 13765 This is to certify that Captain Abdul-Aziz Mahmood Abu-Reddat entered in October 1975 and graduated from the Vyshtel Academy in March 1976 majoring in the course of Infantry Battalion Commander The bearer of the Present Certificate enjoys the privilege for independent activity associated with the Major Subject Commanding Officer: И. И. И. Signature: И. И. И. Date: 16 March 1976 Registration No 3012/140
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Soviets aided PLO in an international network through contacts abroad, intelligence and training as indicated by this certificate awarded to PLO 'trainee' by Soviet Ministry of Defense

to Angola or Mozambique, with 'local arrangements' made there. In some cases the foreign bodies paid cash for the arms and services, in most they got a free ride.

But the PLO's own suppliers, knowing that it was well endowed with cash, insisted on payment for the arms shipped to the PLO in Lebanon. A "teutonically-thorough" document found reports an agreement concluded by a PLO delegation with the East Germans. Dated April 18, 10 00 hours, the document states that the 'export manager' has prepared the list the PLO delegation requested, and quotes prices — a real bargain in some cases. All prices are quoted in U.S. dol-

lars — by the Democratic Republic of Germany, "FOB Rostock Port." A small armed patrol boat is only U.S. \$ 118,000. BZT anti-tank bullets are a steal at \$1,792 for 22,500 122 mm gun shells are available at \$160 for up to 1,100 explosive shells, but only \$100 per shell for up to 250 illumination shells.

As yet, most of the documents found, including testimonies obtained referring to the PLO's foreign 'friends', are still very much on Israel's 'classified' list — and so the full extent of the PLO's international connection has yet to be revealed.

Theodore Levite

TERRORISTS CAME FROM FAR AND WIDE TO JOIN THE PLO

The ranks of PLO terrorists were filled not only by Palestinians supporting a national cause, but by Arabs generally, and, in fact, terrorist factions from around the world. Although many came to Lebanon, until Operation Peace for Galilee the world center for terrorist training, for "field courses" not available elsewhere, a significant number were imported from neighboring Arab countries with promises of fortunes to be earned.

At a recent press conference in Tel Aviv, one captured Yemenite terrorist explained his reasons for joining the PLO. Drafted by the Fatah in South Yemen, he was promised a monthly salary of 1,500 Lebanese pounds (\$288). When he reached Lebanon, however, he found that he would only be getting LP644 (\$125). In the meantime, he had left a job in South Yemen where his salary was the equivalent of LP1,000 (\$192).

An Iraqi prisoner, 32 years old, entered the PLO army not for money, but as alternative service to the Iraqi army. He explained that he had been living in a small village in Southern

Iraq and had resisted the Iraqi draft. Hiding from the authorities for 10 years, he was finally caught and inducted. Within four months he had deserted, but was pardoned when he opted for three years' service with one of the PLO military groups.

The four prisoners questioned at Tel Aviv's Beit Sokolov represent terrorists captured in Lebanon from such countries as Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Germany, France and Norway. As yet the Israeli government has not indicated what action will be taken against either captured Palestinians or foreign nationals serving in the PLO forces.

In 1950 the Knesset adopted a law to prevent and punish genocide, which was defined as any act intended to exterminate fully or partly any national, ethnic, racial or religious group. The penalty is death. It is the only crime on the books punishable by capital punishment.

Both documents seized and testimony from captured prisoners corroborate the PLO-advocated total extermination of the Jewish people. Add to that the evidence of atrocities recently come to light by the PLO against Lebanese citizens, and the captured terrorists, if prosecuted by Israel, may not have a prayer.

ARTICLES FROM THE PRESS

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JULY 25, 1982

Lebanese Tell of Anguish Of Living Under the P.L.O.

By DAVID K. SHIPLER
Special to The New York Times

SIDON, Lebanon — For about six years, until Israel invaded southern Lebanon on June 6, the Palestinians had something closely approaching an independent state.

It had an army, a police force, a crude judicial system, an educational and welfare system, a civil service and a foreign policy. Those who lived within its rough boundaries said they were too terrified then to describe it to outsiders. Now, for the first time, they are describing what it was like, telling of theft, intimidation and violence.

Its territory was scattered in patches of influence, from its de facto capital in west Beirut and the adjacent camps, where the Palestinians shared control with the Syrian Army, to its provincial areas of virtually exclusive Palestinian control, a region that extended southward along the sparkling Mediterranean, through the coastal cities of Damur, Sidon and Tyre, and inland across terraced hills east and south of the town of Nabatiye.

Under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization, it comprised an array of competing factions, some pro-Syrian, some pro-Iraqi, all less influential than Al Fatah, the faction headed by Yasir Arafat. Its authority flourished amid the weaknesses of the Lebanese Government.

But politics here was much more than patronage and debate. The major tool of persuasion was the gun, according to those who lived through it.

The citizens of this state within a state were those who had not been allowed to become citizens of Lebanon: the Palestinians, about 300,000 of them, whose impoverished, squalid settlements of nameless alleys and humble concrete houses became the P.L.O.'s political and military centers. Most of them, or their parents, had come in 1948 in flight from the fighting in Israel's war of independence.

Most of those subject to the P.L.O.'s

rule, however, were Lebanese nationals in the cities and villages beyond the boundaries of the camps, both Christians and Moslems, who said they felt powerless in their own homes. They are the ones who are now most willing to tell their stories.

Their degree of candor seems unaffected by the presence or absence of Israeli officers during conversations. Some are still circumspect, afraid the P.L.O. will return after Israel withdraws; others open up in a spirit of relief.

The Palestinian guerrillas came unannounced to Dr. Ramsey Shabb's country estate in the hills east of Sidon. He recalled that he first saw them camped beneath the orange trees when he drove out to his land one day. They had set up rocket launchers in his orange groves; crates of ammunition were stacked nearby.

In the days that followed, he said, he noticed that one of his small outbuildings had been filled with boxes of explosives and ammunition. As the weeks passed, barns became armories, fuel drums appeared, jeeps and trucks arrived, 130-millimeter artillery pieces were deployed among his 100 acres of orange groves and vineyards.

The guerrillas finally began to move into his main house, an elegant stone building on a hilltop, built by his father. Dr. Shabb said they left him one upstairs room, and he had to pretend that this was all fine. But he stopped taking his family there for weekends, staying instead in an apartment he kept in the private hospital he owned in Sidon.

"They were taking over everything, everything," said his daughter, Rima, a student at the American University in Beirut. "They were the Government," his wife, Salwa, added.

Patchwork of Fiefdoms

The takeover of land and houses began as the P.L.O. spread from the camps after the 1975-76 civil war, when the Lebanese Government disintegrated and Lebanon descended into a dark level of lawlessness, carved by

religious and ethnic strife into a patchwork of fiefdoms ruled by a variety of armed gangs — Palestinian factions, Christian militias, Moslem leftists, Druse militiamen, Syrian troops.

In the south, within striking distance of Israel, the Palestinians seemed to make special efforts to push their control beyond the limits of the camps so they could have the freedom to move and to build a military structure. And so they took houses.

"Our cook went home one day after she finished work," said Dr. Shabb, "and she found a family sitting in a room with many kids. They forced her to stay in one small room, and they used the rest of the house, and she could not do anything."

"My mother had a small garden here," he continued. "They would come and cut the flowers. She once told a 10-year-old boy not to do it, and he said, 'We'll blow up your house.' Two years ago, she sent away somebody with a goat, and they dynamited her house, damaging the veranda."

Ahiam Ghandour, whose husband is a wealthy importer, said she protected her luxurious house in the hills outside Nabatiye by never leaving it empty, by never going away on trips, by staying alert to any sign of P.L.O. encroachment. "Once a Palestinian came and put a Land-Rover at my house," she recalled. "I said, 'Please don't leave it here, maybe an Israeli plane will see it and bomb my house.' He said, 'Okay, Madame,' and left."

There were overtones here of a class struggle, for the poor Palestinians in the camps had provided cheap labor for years in the citrus groves and the factories of the wealthy Lebanese. And although some Palestinians had made it up and out of the camps, achieving higher education and often some wealth themselves, the masses had not. The rank and file of the guerrillas seemed to come from the lowest strata, and often, therefore, the P.L.O.'s armed muscle blended with a bitter material greed. The Lebanese found themselves helpless.

Thefts by P.L.O. Are Described

In the picturesque Maronite Christian village of Lebbaa, east of Sidon, for example, an opportunistic cousin of the Raad family arranged for Palestinians to rent a country house belonging to the father of Dolly Raad, a 26-year-old executive of Middle East Airlines. Miss Raad said it was a deal made both in acquiescence to the occupiers and to the prospect of money, for the P.L.O. leaders had, by all accounts, a lot of money.

The Palestinians turned the house into a restaurant and casino, provoking complaints from neighbors about noise and an unsavory clientele. Then, about two years ago, they locked it up, abandoned it and stopped paying rent, Miss Raad explained. "We asked for it back. They said no."

Both Lebanese and Palestinians describe such outright theft as a common practice of the P.L.O. guerrillas. They often took things from shops without paying, Miss Raad and others complained. Youssef Alifreh, a young Palestinian resident of the Burj al Shemali camp, near Tyre, confirmed it. "Now we are happy because the armed P.L.O. left," he declared. "When somebody wanted to buy something, he would take it and not pay, and if someone would complain, he would shoot him."

At 4 P.M. one day three years ago, a mixed detachment of a dozen P.L.O. and Syrian troops arrived at the home of Zouhair Ladki, a 25-year-old Moslem, in Khalde, just south of Beirut. They ordered the family out, saying they had to check reports that an "American spy" was hiding inside. When the "search" was finished, Mr. Ladki said, many things were missing: his mother's jewelry, television sets, a videotape recorder, a hi-fi set, even some rugs.

Cars Coveted by Guerrillas

Automobiles also became a coveted prize for guerrillas. Two respectable-looking gentlemen from the P.L.O. walked into one Sidon new car dealership, Dr. Shabb recalled, inquired about a certain model, asked if they could test-drive it, got in and disappeared.

At many checkpoints along the roads, young toughs brandishing Soviet-made assault rifles often stopped the cars they fancied and simply took them, as they still do in west Beirut. An auto-theft ring grew up in the south. "If you pay 7,000 pounds," or about \$1,400, said Rima Shabb with a smile, "you will get your car back. If you pay 14,000, you will get somebody else's. If you're an elderly person driving an old car, you're safe."

Many Lebanese left their good cars in the garage. Miss Raad never drove her well-kept Mercedes-Benz to work at the airport in west Beirut, which was controlled by the P.L.O. and Syria, taking instead an old, beat-up Mercedes that she jokingly called "the Rolls-Royce." "We never washed it," she said.

Some Lost Farms and Orchards

The economic impact of the P.L.O. takeover is difficult to assess, but it seems to have been felt keenly by retailers and farmers. Storekeepers were hurt in towns such as Nabatiye, where an estimated population of 35,000, mostly Shiite Moslems, dwindled rapidly to about 4,000 or 5,000 as those who could afford to move fled to Beirut and environs, leaving only the poor and the sympathetic leftists. The town's once-flourishing market withered and has only now begun to revive as residents stream southward to regain their homes after the P.L.O.'s departure.

For the farmers, the problems were exemplified at Dr. Shabb's estate. The guerrilla squatters took a great deal of his citrus and grape crop; what was left he sold, as usual, to a man who hired laborers to pick it, but the man paid a much lower price than before, knowing that he would have to give a portion to the P.L.O.

Dr. Shabb, a surgeon, kept the farm only as a hobby. But he said that "many people who lived from their farms and orchards went bankrupt when the P.L.O. came in."

For many Palestinians, however, the P.L.O. was protector and benefactor.


Some in the crowded camps recall the pitifully low wages the citrus-pickers once received in the south, and they credit the P.L.O. with forcing employers to improve the pay. The results were reflected in rising living standards.

"Conditions improved," said Sami Masri as he stood amid the rubble of the Rashidiye camp on the outskirts of Tyre. It had been a major P.L.O. base and headquarters, and fighting there was severe.

"There used to be no electricity here. In all of Rashidiye there were no refrigerators, no automatic washers." The P.L.O., he said, organized not only military training for the youngsters of the camp, but also soccer teams, chess clubs, Ping-Pong tournaments. A youth recreation center was set up in a concrete building that now lies crushed under the weight of war.

Employers, however, found the P.L.O.'s labor-organizing a bit unorthodox. The head of the public works department in southern Lebanon said the guerrillas had made his life miserable by stealing his equipment and limiting his authority over his workers.

"Men repairing roads were supposed to work eight hours a day," he remarked, "but they worked five or six. They would come at 10 and be gone by 4. We couldn't do anything. If I tried to make them work, I was afraid. You



would go to the south and they would shoot you and nobody would ever know."

Lebanese Government Ineffective

As the P.L.O. became the government, the Lebanese governmental structure retreated into the shadows of impotence. Elected officials stepped aside or stood quietly while they were circumvented. Policemen took off their uniforms or sat in their offices doing paperwork. Judges left the bench, lawyers left town.

"You know our people follow the strong one," Mayor Ali Khalid Shaalan of Tyre said with a smile of apology. The entire City Council complied with the P.L.O.'s demand that they step down, the Mayor said, except him. "The Palestinians pressured me to resign and to leave everything in their hands. But of course I refused and told them I was ready to die before giving them the municipality." Instead of killing him, they worked around him, stripping him of authority.

In Nabatiye, the Lebanese provincial Governor, Adnan Ibrahim, came to work each day, busying himself by providing municipal services to towns and villages in the region. A thin man with horn-rimmed glasses and a look of melancholy, he still speaks with the pain of those years.

Contempt Shown for P.L.O.

"I worked," he said in French, "but with such difficulty. I supported what was insupportable. I worked without having power. They did not want the police here. We were never free to say what we thought. We were not allowed to hang the picture of the President of the republic during the Palestinian occupation."

Then he slipped into the present tense, as if nothing had changed but his willingness to speak. "They drink the water," he said contemptuously of the P.L.O., "they light the buildings, they use the roads — without paying a piaster. I am working in a minefield. A Palestinian officer comes here to my office, I salute him. It is a necessity."

In a Tyre police station, around a table with five policemen who had just been put back into action by the Israelis, the recollections of their years of eclipse under the P.L.O. brought a carefully worded outrage.

"I worked only with paper," said one of the policemen, fingering a crime report. "If somebody shot somebody, he would be protected by the Palestinians. I worked on that, but on paper."

But what seemed to stir his anger most deeply was the sense of profound humiliation. "I would go in my automobile," he explained, "they would stop me and ask for my card. Me! I'm a policeman! I should demand their card!" And what did he do about it? "I showed my card and went on."

The wounded honor exacted a heavy toll, according to Clinton Bailey, an Is-



The New York Times/Ingeborg Lippman

A young Palestinian gunman, heavily armed, joking with comrades in 1978 at an outpost near Tyre, Lebanon. In the period between the Lebanese civil war of 1975-76 and the current Israeli invasion, the southern portion of Lebanon became something approaching a Palestinian state.

raeli specialist in Arab affairs who is serving with the army as an adviser in southern Lebanon. In extensive conversations with local residents, he has concluded that the P.L.O. left angry scars. "One of the most important elements in an Arab's life is honor," Mr. Bailey said, "and honor is connected to strength. These people being pushed around by armed elements is really the worst thing that can happen."

Security and Judicial System

As the police and court systems were sapped of authority, the P.L.O. fashioned a crude security and judicial system of its own, one that had applied for many years in the camps. These townships were considered out of bounds to the Lebanese police, even in the late 1960's. After King Hussein drove the armed P.L.O. units out of Jordan in the "Black September" civil war of 1970, many of the leaders and fighters moved to Lebanon to plant the seeds of quasi-independence by reinforcing the camps' sovereignty.

By 1976 or 1977, according to both Palestinians and Lebanese, the disparate factions of the P.L.O. had established forces with a police function, an internal security force to combat espionage and discipline faction members, and a network of local "people's committees" to arbitrate disputes and hand out punishment.

Mercenaries Are Brought In

The situation seemed to worsen over the years as the P.L.O., hard-pressed to fill military quotas, brought mercenaries in from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and North African countries. By all accounts, the outsiders were largely crude, undisciplined thugs whose tension with the population was worsened by their inability to speak Arabic and communicate with the people they were threatening.

But the P.L.O. was not on a campaign to win friends among the Lebanese. Its thrust was military. The huge sums of money the P.L.O. received from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries seems

to have been spent primarily on weapons and ammunition, which were placed strategically in densely populated civilian areas in the hope that this would either deter Israeli attacks or exact a price from Israel in world opinion for killing civilians.

Towns and camps were turned into vast armories as crates of ammunition were stacked in underground shelters and anti-aircraft guns were emplaced in schoolyards, among apartment houses, next to churches and hospitals. The remains could be seen soon after the fighting, and Palestinians and Lebanese can still point out the sites.

Dedicated Military Effort

East of Sidon, a deep tunnel in the side of a mountain, two football fields long, was crammed so tightly with grenades, rockets, artillery shells, missiles, explosives and small arms ammunition that only a narrow corridor was left for people to walk in.

So dedicated was the P.L.O.'s military effort that even the extensive ancient Roman ruins in Tyre, excavated and partially reconstructed by Lebanese authorities over the years, were made into a base and placed off-limits to tourists and to the Lebanese custodians. Visitors who chanced to take a picture of the columns and sarcophagi saw the wrong end of a rifle, one custodian said. Remains of P.L.O. arsenals can still be seen beneath the rebuilt seats of the hippodrome; archeologists say that no damage was done other than through neglect.

P.L.O. Conscription Program

An extensive P.L.O. conscription program drafted Palestinian boys as young as 12 and mobilized all male students

for one to three months of duty a year, according to some Palestinians. During the invasion, Israeli soldiers said they found themselves in combat with 12- and 13-year-olds shooting rocket-propelled grenades. More than 200 youngsters from 12 to 15 were captured and have been released.

The P.L.O.'s draft apparently stirred resentment, for Rima Shabb told of checkpoints being set up during mobilization periods to catch young Palestinians who were trying to run away. Doctors said they often gave boys and young men notes exempting them for false medical reasons. Sister Alisse Araigi, headmistress of a Maronite school in Nabatiye, said, "Families came to us and asked for certificates that children were sick and couldn't be drafted."

There is tentative evidence that the P.L.O. used the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which cares for Palestinians and receives 25 percent of its budget from the United States, as a kind of civil service to enforce and carry out its draft and military training program. The curriculum in agency schools was laced with anti-Semitism and themes of militant nationalism. The Sibli teachers' training school east of Sidon was obviously given a heavily military cast, as a visit to the dormitories full of uniforms and the storerooms full of ammunition revealed.

Youssef Sayed, a 25-year-old Palestinian from the Ein Khilwe camp near Sidon, said that when a student was called up for a month's military service with the P.L.O., "he is obliged to go, otherwise he won't be accepted next year in the Unrwa school." When asked

how this could be, he explained, "The Unrwa personnel are in the P.L.O." Several other men, including an employee of the agency, nodded in agreement.

Bitterness at Changes

Some of the bitterness now spills over. Amid the ruins of the Rashidiye camp, an old man, Ahmed Mahmoud, began shouting angrily to a reporter that his 18-year-old son had been "forced to become a fighter," and that as a result, he was now in an Israeli prison camp.

"People living here from 1948 were living all right," he said, referring to the original refugees, as distinct from the P.L.O. leaders who arrived later. "But some people came from other places, they put people under pressure, they made some difficulties. We lived here as if it were our country, we worked, our children were studying, we were happy in Lebanon."

A woman broke in, shrieking: "We are all Palestinians! There are no differences! Don't try to draw lines between us!" He shouted back:

"Our children were working in the lemon groves, and then the P.L.O. came and forced them into service!"

For the Lebanese, none of this had any virtue. "Life was terrible," said Khalil Hamdan, who owns a gas station in Harouf, a Shiite village near Nabatiye. "They never used their brain," he said of the guerrillas. "They used their Kalashnikov. Even in the car, they used a machine gun to open the road for them." They blew their horns, he said, and shot into the air as well, an effective means of getting traffic out of their way.

The Tale of the Recalcitrant Imam

Mr. Hamdan's village had a particularly rough time because it resisted the spreading P.L.O. control. One resident, Hassan Bader el-Din, told a searing tale about his brother, Ali Bader el-Din, the imam of the village who returned in 1979 from 12 years of religious study in the Shiite institutes of Iraq.

The imam consistently refused demands to inject Palestinian nationalist themes into his sermons in the mosque. Two years ago during Ramadan, the month of fasting, the pressure on him grew intense, for he was giving sermons every day. Still he resisted. On the morning of the 19th day of Ramadan, he arose as usual to take his morning meal before the fast began at dawn. Then, while it was still dark, he left his house to walk the 50 yards to the mosque. He never arrived.

After several days of fruitless inquiry by his family, a shepherd in the village of Deir Zaharani, four miles away, found his body, shot once through the head, beneath a bridge.

Nighttime Funeral Ordered

Fearing a large turnout for his funeral, the P.L.O. required that it be held at night, which is not done in Islam. But later, 5,000 came to a memorial service. Obviously concerned, Yasir Arafat visited Harouf, went to the family and spoke particularly to the sheik's 10-year-old son, Mohammed.

According to the brother, who was present, Mr. Arafat told the boy, "The Zionists killed your father." He pulled out his pistol, a Czechoslovak model, and gave it to young Mohammed, saying, "We consider your father a hero of the Palestinian revolution. When you grow up, use this to take revenge." The brother has turned the gun over to the Israeli Army, and it has been shown to correspondents.

At another nearby village, when Sheik Mohammed al-Masri tried to resist the encroachment of Palestinian factions, he said his 15-year-old daughter was raped and murdered.

Ali Ismaili Hatib, also from Harouf,

lost his 19-year-old son, Hussein, to the P.L.O. The young man, working in Libya, came home for vacation, his father said, got into a taxi in Beirut, and was stopped at a checkpoint outside the village. "They saw he had a lot of gifts and valuable things," said the old man, now 70, "and as the car pulled away, they shot him in the back."

Accused of Being U.S. Spy

The next day, a P.L.O. delegation came to say that "the Zionists" had killed him and to offer the family a monthly allowance. The old man refused it.

Zouhair Ladki of Khalde also had trouble when he returned to Lebanon last March after a period of study in the United States. At a checkpoint 10 minutes from Beirut airport, the P.L.O. looked at his passport, noticed the American visa stamped in it, blindfolded him, held him for 36 hours, questioned him about being an American agent — "Why are you coming from the

U.S.A., did they brainwash you?" they asked — and then released him.

It was this paranoia, the constant fear of being infiltrated by spies, that led to much of what seemed like random killing. Mr. Ladki is a Moslem who does emergency rescue work for the International Red Cross, and therefore wears a large red cross over his shirt, front and back. He recalled an episode in 1978, when a bomb destroyed a 14-story building in the Sabra camp in Beirut.

"We helped for two weeks to dig up bodies," he said. "They began to be suspicious about us being 'not clean,' as they say. They asked, 'Why are you a Moslem and put a cross on yourself?'" The Palestinians killed three of his team.

So many friends and relatives died that he began to build an emotional wall around himself. "I lost too many dear friends," he said. "To come from a

country like the U.S.A. and expect to find your dear friends — one was killed just because his father was in the Moslem Brotherhood. For nine months I have been afraid to make friendships again."

"I can understand that," said Dolly Raad, "because for a long time I did not want to become attached to anyone or anything, because you know you can lose it, and that will affect you very much."

"Before the P.L.O.," she continued, "we used to be pro-Palestinian. They were driven out of Palestine, they were massacred. On a humanitarian level, we supported them. It's very easy to have compassion for this people. You see them and you pity them. Before '75 we had this opinion. They were poor, we should help them."

"In '76 they stopped a bus and said that those who were Christians, come

down. My cousin stepped down, and was killed. When we saw the Palestinians were killing us and threatening us and having barricades and shooting innocent people, then came the hatred."

"I don't know if you can understand the fear of being in the dark," Miss Raad went on, "and expecting to see someone who is going to kill you, and is an expert in killing. In '76 you couldn't see women without black dresses. It was a black year. Everyone had lost a husband, a son. Everyone was wearing black."

In the rubble-strewn camp of Rashidiye, where the P.L.O. had a major headquarters and military base, Sami Masri, a Palestinian man, understood. "Maybe if I were Lebanese, I would have that same anger," he said. "These poor Lebanese, they are in between."

CONTEMPORARY MIDEAST BACKGROUNDER

RECEIVED OCT 12 1982

to:

date:

BACKGROUNDER #137

Focal Points

THE PALESTINIANS, JORDAN AND THE PLO -

A QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION

(part 2*)

Examining the relations between the Beirut-based PLO and the 300,000 Palestinians in Kuwait, one tends to dwell upon the fact that the Fatah was established (in 1959) in Kuwait, that there exists an active pro-PLO lobby in Kuwait, and that Khalid Al-Hassan (Arafat's top adviser) has a Kuwaiti nationality and has been living in Kuwait for many years.

However, it may be advisable to note that the first sprinkling of Palestinians came to the Persian Gulf state already in the 1930's. Since then, there has been a consistent flow of Palestinian migrants into the Gulf area (e.g. Dubai in the early 40's), pursuing purely family and economic interests rather than national ideology. The main attraction for these migrants - leaving Palestine long before the 1948 war - was the oil concessionaire and related British construction companies which drew heavily on Palestinians for administrative staff and skilled labor. In this way, many Palestinians became entrenched in the Kuwaiti military and security forces.

The impact of that development on the issue of PLO-Palestinian relations may be construed from the following observations:

- (1) In light of the social transformation compounding the heterogeneous nature of the various Palestinian communities (within and without Palestine);
- (2) Against the background of the growing dependency of the Palestinians on the local system within which they reside (Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, etc.);

*Part 1 deals with the question of representation in Judea and Samaria.

**Media
Analysis
Center**

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(3) Against the backdrop of the inherent fragmentation characterizing inter-Arab politics;

(4) And in light of the periodical conflict of interests between the PLO and all Arab leaders (the weaker regimes fear it, while the stronger wish to tighten their control over it).

In light of the above observations one may assume that the agreement on the nature of the PLO's final goal (a Palestinian state over all Palestine) is constantly overshadowed by conflict of interests between the Beirut-based PLO and the various Palestinian communities when it comes to ongoing means and intermediary goals advocated and executed by the PLO.

Hence, contrary to the declarative and ritualistic commitment to the PLO, the Palestinians in the several Arab countries do commit themselves meaningfully to their local system (i.e., Palestinian volunteers from Jordan fight in Iraq against Iran, but refrain from a similar commitment in the PLO war against Israel).

Jordan has introduced a new dimension further complicating the overall heterogeneous Palestinian social structure outside Jordan. The reference is to the migration of Palestinians holding Jordanian passports (from Jordan and from Judea and Samaria) to the Gulf area. These Palestinians belong to the Jordan-based middle-class, effectively competing with Lebanon-based Palestinians (who left Lebanon following the 1958 and 1975-76 civil war) and locally-based Palestinians. They also form a powerful part of the Palestinian Gulf community, still retain their ties with the Jordanian system, and are therefore frequently engaged in socio-economic-political confrontations with the pro-PLO Palestinians in the area, and enjoy the backing of the Gulf regimes (who wish to limit the influence of the pro-PLO Palestinians).

Jordan-PLO Relations

"Actually, Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan, but the issue is the Palestinian rights of the Palestinian person, the Arab, the Christian, the Moslem in Jerusalem and in every part of the occupied land...Gaza is the Gaza of Hashem, (the uncle of the prophet Muhammad) who preceded the Prophet, and we the Hashemites bear his name, and we are his descendents."

That statement by King Hussein (in a December 28, 1981 interview with the Lebanese weekly AL-NAHAR AL-ARABI) serves as an expression of the inherent PLO-Jordan conflict over the right to represent the majority of King Hussein's subjects (65% of the inhabitants of Jordan - 1,200,000 - are Palestinians, while the 700,000 residents of Judea and Samaria are Jordanian citizens - together totaling some 50% of the Palestinians which the PLO claims to represent).

That statement may also provide the background for the application of the 1976 Jordanian Conscription Law to the residents of Judea and Samaria (Jordanian AL-DOSTOUR, April 26, 1982), a law which was approved by Hussein on January 21, 1976 - 1½ years following the Rabbat Conference which, supposedly, transferred the title over Judea and Samaria from Hussein to the PLO.

The Conscription Law has not been the only step undertaken by the Hashemite King, rendering the Rabbat Conference resolutions declarative and non-committal in nature. Similarly, Jordanian salaries are paid to officials in Judea and Samaria (Al-FAJR, February 22, 1982); Jordanian officials have conducted a population census in the area and have issued Jordanian passports; a ministry in charge of "the occupied territories" was established two years ago (far from suggesting renunciation of the title over Judea and Samaria) and the April 1950 law uniting the East and the West Banks of the Jordan, the 1975/76 amendments strengthening the unification law, and the 1960 citizenship law enabling every Palestinian to become a Jordanian citizen - all have remained a central feature of Hussein's policy vis a vis the PLO (contrary to, and superceding, his frequent expressions of verbal support for the PLO).

Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan demonstrates the clear distinction between (pro-PLO) rhetoric and reality in an article published in the Spring 1982 edition of FOREIGN AFFAIRS. While he pays the usual lip service to the PLO, Hassan emphasizes a few points which have to do with reality (and with the Hashemite claim for the representation of some 50% of the Palestinians) in the Mideast:

"We cannot speak in place of the Palestinians. At the same time, however, as a leading Jordanian social scientist has written: 'The Jordanians and Palestinians are now one people, and no political loyalty, however strong, will separate them permanently.' Consider for a moment the following (continues Hassan): Half of Jordan's population is Palestinian (in a previous paragraph he notes the fact that 'there are more Palestinians in Jordan than in any other state'): The West Bank and East Jerusalem, both captured by Israel in 1967, were part of Jordan; If there is a large-scale Palestinian migration as a result of any regional settlement, Jordan will necessarily be greatly affected; virtually all Palestinians currently residing in Jordan are Jordanian nationals; After any settlement, as before it, Jordan will share a long border with Israel (clarifying the non-recognition, by Jordan, of a Palestinian entity between Israel and Jordan.' ed. note); pending the creation of a Palestinian state, it is still Jordan which pays the salaries and pensions of West Bank officials; it is Jordan which bears some development costs of the territory and whose approval is necessary for such projects; it is in the Jordanian parliament that the inhabitants of the West Bank are represented; it is Jordanian law that has effect in the West Bank...Even those Palestinians who find our Hashemite tradition, our form of government, and our abiding faith in God distasteful, those blinded by ideology who see us as reactionaries or lackeys or worse, even they understand today how deep and indissoluble have grown the relationships between Palestinian and Jordanian."

The policy-line set by the Jordanian King and Crown Prince is adhered to by Jordan's Ambassador to Qatar, Khaled Ubidat (Al DOSTOUR, February 1, 1982). He thus subscribes to the notion that Jordan's credentials as a Palestinian state - ruled by the Hashemite minority - are based on the facts that Jordan constitutes 78% of British Mandate Palestine; that 65% of its inhabitants are Palestinians;

that 85% of Amman's population are Palestinians; that half of the Cabinet - including the Prime Minister - is Palestinian, that 50% of the army - including high ranking officers - is Palestinian; that the Palestinians control the banking, commercial, financial, bureaucratic and educational sectors in Jordan: and that they constitute the only majority in the Mideast (where almost all regimes are controlled by minority rulers) truly integrated by the ruling minority.

According to Ubaidat "in 1948 the Jordanian Army succeeded in saving what it could of the soil of Palestine; it carried-out the unification of the East and West Banks in a totally legal fashion, in accordance with the desire of the Palestinian citizens who held a number of Conferences (on behalf of the Hashemites) in Jericho and Amman. A Parliament was chosen from both Banks, and a unification plan announced which was then put into effect. Thus, the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples have been working shoulder-to-shoulder in full accord, in order to build a glorious future for Jordan and for the entire Arab nation. This was like the unification of the Mahajirun and the Ansar." (The Muhajirun migrated with the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina. In time this group integrated with the Ansar of Medina, who also became Moslem, until it was impossible to differentiate between the two groups - ed. note).

The historic dimension of the inherent Jordan-PLO conflict over the issue of "who represents the Palestinians?" is presented by Zeev Bar-Lavi and Zvi Al-Peleg of the Tel Aviv University Shiloah Institute (September 1981 , February 1982 monograms.) The following are a few developments mentioned by these two experts on Palestinian and Jordanian affairs:

- (1) Jordanian military units moved into Judea and Samaria following World War II, and consolidated their control during the 1948 War;
- (2) The "Palestine Congress" convened in Amman on October 1, 1948, inviting King Abdallah "to settle the Palestinian issue as he sees fit;"
- (3) The "Jericho Conference" convened in Jericho on December 1, 1948 as a follow-up to the Palestine Congress, calling upon Abdallah to rule over the union of the East and West Banks;
- (4) The April 3, 1949 cease-fire agreement signed between Israel and Jordan further solidified Jordan's hold over Judea and Samaria;
- (5) The Jordanian Parliament- representing both Banks of the Jordan River - approved on April 24, 1950 the law uniting both Banks and changed the name of the Kingdom from "The Trans-Jordan Hashemite Kingdom" to "The Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom."
- (6) Upon establishment of the PLO on May 1, 1964, the PLO demanded the following: the founding of a Palestinian army - on Jordanian soil - under the command of the PLO; the supply of weapons to Jordanian villages bordering Israel which will be under the command of the PLO; the levying of a special PLO tax on all wages and salaries earned by Palestinians in Jordan. Hussein's reply was: that only Jordan represents its inhabitants, including

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the Palestinians (Hussein proceeded to extend Jordanian citizenship to any Palestinian who wished to become a Jordanian regardless where he resided; that Jordan is Palestine, and there is no room for another Palestinian entity; that the liberation of "occupied Palestinian soil" should be undertaken by sovereign Arab states, and that there is no right for the existence of a Palestinian liberation army; that once the whole of Palestine is liberated, Jordan will be the last to deprive the Palestinians from determining their own future.

After years of occupation, a summer of pain and untruth.

LEBANON EYEWITNESS

BY MARTIN PERETZ

MUCH OF WHAT you have read in the newspapers and newsmagazines about the war in Lebanon—and even more of what you have seen and heard on television—is simply not true. At best, the routine reportorial fare, to say nothing of editorial or columnists' commentary, has been wrenched out of context, detached from history, exaggerated, distorted. Then there are the deliberate and systematic falsifications: remarkably little of what has been alleged in various published protest statements against the Israeli action in Lebanon is fact. I know, I was there.

So too, of course, were hundreds of other journalists, most of them honest men and women, hardworking and skeptical. Indeed, if one could contrive to get one's news, only from, say, David Shipler of *The New York Times* covering the Israeli side of the war lines, and from Thomas Friedman, also of the *Times*, working out of the PLO-held zone; perhaps with some occasional glances at David Ignatius's complex impressions in *The Wall Street Journal*, Eric Silver's reports in *The Guardian* of London, David Ottaway's dispatches in *The Washington Post*, and Arnold Hottinger's analyses in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*—and, in deference to the age of visual simultaneity, take in the National Public Radio broadcasts of Jim Ledderman and the telecasts of the Cable News Network and of Independent Network News, which in depth of understanding and respect for viewers' intelligence outclass the big three—then one might have a reasonably balanced view of recent events and their background.

But few of us are immune to the impact of the thirty-second TV news update, the headline that tells all but what's important, the human-interest particular that misrepresents by universalizing, the analogy that warps rather than illumines. (The most obscene of this last is the comparison of Beirut, where six thousand PLO gunmen hold a civilian population hostage to their last-ditch battle with Israel, with the Warsaw ghetto, all of whose inhabitants were marked by ascription for death by the Nazis. This likening of the Jews to the Nazis and of the PLO to the Jews is sometimes made less directly by characterizing the Israeli invasion as "genocidal" and Israeli war aims as "the final solution to the Palestinian problem." It is possible that some use these words sloppily, the way people once talked about American genocide in Vietnam—or Harlem.

Others use them knowingly, which is to say, knowing well how inappropriate they are.) Mass culture makes much of our politics derivative of such superficialities: the media, fast-paced for multiple deadlines—early edition, late edition, morning news, 7 o'clock news, 11 o'clock news—are always after new, vivid images of conflict, violent if possible, even if they beg, unrequited, for explanation. Why would anyone be interested in buildings that have remained standing or in bodies that have remained whole? The standing order for the armies of the fourth estate is "good copy." Journalists have a professional interest—and it is a vocational hazard for their thinking—in broken necks and amputated limbs, the equivalent of fires and armed robberies on the local news. So we now have people who are thought and who think themselves informed, we now have editorial writers and columnists, officially certified as informed and also wise, who seem to form their political opinions from news photographs.

And why, after all, shouldn't they? Aren't pictures of human suffering in war evidence enough of the wrongness of war? But those who take their opinions from photographs or verbal evocations of war victims are not pacifists; few of the condemnations of Israel are based on pacifist principles or even on vaguely pacifistic sentiment. And few of those who condemn Israel today condemn others when their actions make for similar photographs, or worse ones. In any case, pacifism is not politics. All wars hurt, but some wars are conducted differently from others—yes, more humanely, and to more humane purpose. This I argue—this I saw with my own eyes—is Israel's war in Lebanon. It's a war too complicated to tell about quickly, too taxing by way of historical understanding for correspondents armed with a peculiarly American mixture of ignorance, cynicism, and brashness, who jet from crisis to crisis—looking for Vietnam, and, if possible, for Watergate, too. There is one other factor: a cohort of journalists specializing in the Middle East—Jonathan Randal, William Claiborne, Edward Cody, and Jim Hoagland, all of *The Washington Post*, lead the pack—with a record to defend. The events in Lebanon prove them wrong, some of them deceitfully so, and they shape the facts—as they want to shape the future—to disguise the disservice they've done their

readers, which is to say the disservice they've done the truth and, therefore, the foreign policy of our country as well.

II.

About ten days into the war, THE NEW REPUBLIC noted editorially that there had been "terrible civilian casualties . . . terrible Israeli callousness." With the specificity that the computer age requires, two numbers had by then been bruited about in the media. One widely cited report numbered the dead at 10,122; another, at 9,583. The figure that took hold in the public's imagination was a neat 10,000 fatalities, to which were added anywhere from 16,000 to 40,000 wounded, and no less than 600,000 refugees. (Another recent figure claims 700,000.) TNK had been skeptical of the statistics from the first, but, deep down, I feared that perhaps the Israelis had actually been "unforgettably bloody," as the *Post* would later put it, causing "widespread slaughter of civilians." I too had seen on television the bombed-out buildings of Sidon.

There is no way to be pleasantly surprised as one travels north from sleepy Nahariya, on Israel's Mediterranean coast, into Lebanese territory. Waterside roads have been strafed, trees uprooted, cars damaged, roofs of the occasional shoreline houses blown out; PLO artillery pieces, carcasses of a self-defeating illusion, litter the landscape. The UNIFIL outposts—those preposterous redoubts of French, Nepalese, Fijian, and Dutch witnesses to the inability of international authority to keep the promise made to Israel after 1978 that Palestinian terrorists would not again assault its settlements—are untouched. The fighting here was fast, and, as army types aseptically put it, "light." No one says that south of Tyre many civilians, or any, were caught in harm's way.

Tyre is where the controversy about civilian casualties starts and Sidon is where it ends. The casualties of West Beirut, whose destiny the PLO holds in its hands, were never counted in the early estimates that first provoked indignation. Tyre and Sidon fell to the Israelis after forty-eight hours of heavy fighting. The cities were bombed from the air, shelled from the sea, set upon over the land. These were not, said a saddened Israeli colonel, "manicured attacks." But neither were they indiscriminate or wholesale; this was no war against a civilian population, Lebanese or Palestinian. Whomever I talked to on the streets—and there are many eager to talk, Christian and Moslem, in French or English or Arabic—pointed out that what the Israelis had targeted were invariably military targets. A friend in the States later remonstrated that this observation implicitly faults the PLO for resisting the invasion. It's not that, not that at all—but rather that the PLO resisted, as it had previously aggressed, from the midst of civilian life, and of Lebanese as well as of Palestinian civilian life. With excruciating consistency, the PLO's commanders seemed to favor for their

antiaircraft batteries the courtyards of schools, for their tanks and artillery the environs of hospitals, apartment buildings, and—easiest for them and most devastating for their families—the labyrinthine alleys of the refugee camps, Rashidiye at Tyre and in Ain el-Hilwe at Sidon. The PLO was not alone in turning noncombatant areas into war zones: Jonathan Randal in the *Post* (June 14) gingerly admits from Aazzouniye that "there were also confused reports of Syrian soldiers being in the area of the sanitarium during the fighting." In Jezzín, more beautiful than Aspen, the reports were not confused. Dr. Naji Kannan told me that he had evacuated patients to his own home from his hospital because the Syrians had installed themselves in its confines and wouldn't leave.

ON WHOM, according to the Geneva Convention's laws of war aiming to set inhibitions on the killing of innocents, falls the onus for civilian casualties incurred in populated areas? Had the Israelis I asked, shelled areas from which there was no fire? No one, not even the surly young bank clerk in Tyre, suggested they had. The entrance to Sidon and the city center were devastated—and, I was told by locals, that's exactly where PLO arms and fighters were most densely concentrated. The bombed-out, skeletal evidence of a military infrastructure proved it. In this primarily Moslem locale, PLO headquarters stood directly between the Shabb hospital and Al Fatah's own infirmary. All the same, it was apparent that Israeli forces took pains not to damage such buildings, likely to hold civilians. Even in heavily hit areas, many mosques and other public institutions seemed miraculously to survive unscathed. I wandered freely; I should add, with an officer from Dover Zahal, the army's information unit. He had no itinerary beyond my curiosity.

You've seen the destroyed areas on television, you've probably not seen the vast areas adjacent to them or those five or ten minutes away. In the hills beyond Sidon and Tyre, toward the interior, the countryside has been wholly undisturbed. Here and there are shell marks; natives date them vaguely to five or six years ago. The press has systematically ignored the fact that much of the destruction, in the cities and in other locales like Damour, that it describes and portrays on television is a result of seven years of bitter fighting.

In both major coastal cities, hours before the Israeli attack, leaflets had been dropped, calling on the inhabitants to flee to the beaches, which would be guaranteed by the Israelis as open or war-free zones. That's what the cities could have been had the PLO entrenched themselves in the hills and not in the cities. In Sidon, I was told by a local merchant, the PLO firebombed a street of shops to emphasize its intent that people not leave. (Elsewhere, it was rumored, the PLO killed people who wanted to leave, but I did not hear this from a reliable source myself.) Dr. Pinhas

Harris, Israel's Scottish-born deputy surgeon-general, who returned from leave at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C., to direct the medical relief effort in the south, estimated that more than 100,000 people, perhaps 150,000, took refuge on the beaches north and south of Sidon. Two weeks after the fighting, I could see that there had been a vast encampment. Israelis told me that food had run out quickly. "It is not a happy circumstance to escape to the beaches," Dr. Harris conceded, "but had more civilians heeded our warnings, listened to our importunings, the number of dead would have been infinitesimal."

What were the numbers? "Please don't tell us," Mary McGrory wrote Menachem Begin in an open letter in *The Washington Post* (June 20) "that the figures given by the Lebanese of 9,000 civilian dead are exaggerated." But was it not the numbers which flared tempers? Was it not the numbers which in Richard Cohen's meticulous calculus (*Post*, June 10) of just how little Israel had suffered from recent terrorist attacks—and not what it had prevented in the past and prevented for the future—that made its response "totally out of proportion"? People who talk about proportionality need to be scrupulous about numbers.

NUMBERS HAVE always been a problem in Lebanon: there has been no census for more than a generation, lest fresh figures disrupt the political formula for denominational representation which alone allows Lebanon to be imagined as one country. The PLO will not allow UNRWA to do a count of the refugees in the camps lest allocations be reduced. As on Chicago's voting rolls, old people don't really die in the camps; their food rations go on forever. The population of Lebanon is said to be about three million; this makes the figure of 600,000 new refugees in the south transparent nonsense, since that is roughly the total number of inhabitants of the war zone, from the Mediterranean in the west to the Syrian front in the east. Even the scaled-down number of 300,000 refugees defies logic and one's eyes. A number that never seemed to change is of those in West Beirut. Although for weeks correspondents have described—and I saw—long lines of cars laden with people and belongings leaving the PLO-held sector, there always were 500,000 people left; the Israelis' guess is between 200,000 and 250,000. Finally, making the elementary point that when people leave a city its population decreases, Bernard Gwertzman (*Times*, July 13) estimated there were from 200,000 to 400,000 civilians left. In a sidebar to its March 1981 series on Lebanon, the *Post* told us that there are 400,000 resident Palestinians in the country. But on July 8, Jonathan Randal, the co-author of last year's articles, wrote that there are 500,000. Surely it's not the birthrate. Elsewhere the number 600,000 crops up. So what's one or two hundred thousand among journalists? If no one quibbles about these big numbers, no one should quibble about

a mere few thousand in the death count. Friedman in the *Times* tells us that the current population of Sidon is 200,000; Ottaway in the *Post* says it is 300,000; in the same paper, Cody says it's 200,000. Take your pick.

GIVEN THE impossibility of accurately judging the number of the living, it is not surprising that sloppiness and propaganda determine the number of the dead. In the beginning the high toll seemed to carry the cachet of international relief agencies. Maybe that's why Senator Charles Percy, not ordinarily inclined to see the best in the Israelis anyway accepted the 10,000 figure as close to the truth. But the source was never actually the International Red Cross or any U.N. agency, though they have been widely cited. The numbers came originally from the Palestinian Red Crescent, of which Yasir Arafat's brother is president. Some early Lebanese estimates were close to his. But the numbers from Beirut about the deaths in the south also defy logic and experience. This past winter there were airplane crashes in Washington and Boston; it took more than a week to know exactly how many were dead. But last month, in Lebanon, we received and accepted precise daily figures—and not even from authorities on the spot but from Israel's enemies in besieged Beirut—and elsewhere. (*The New York Times* even called Professor Edward Said on Morningside Heights in New York to check casualty figures.) Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria, joining the litany for the 10,000 dead, said his source was UNICEF. But in Geneva a spokeswoman for UNICEF declared, "We have not reported any casualty figures at all." A phone call to UNICEF headquarters in New York provoked a stronger denial.

This leaves the International Red Cross, which seems absolutely beside itself to deny responsibility for the casualty numbers. David Ottaway reported in the *Post* on June 25 that Francesco Nosedà, head of the Red Cross mission in Lebanon, claimed that "we did not mention here any figure approaching 10,000." He did say that the only numbers the Red Cross had provided were the counts of 47 dead and 247 wounded in Tyre—and these figures, interestingly, are lower than those put out by Israeli authorities. In Tyre, Dr. El Khalil estimated that between 57 and 63 persons had been killed, including civilians from the refugee camps. Dr. Harris told me that Israel "doesn't estimate the dead. We count them. This is why we couldn't give numbers as readily as the people in Beirut. We had no real numbers until the fallen-in buildings were dug out. Maybe there are a few more we won't find." The Israelis didn't hazard an official number until June 22. They admit to some 250 dead in Sidon. In Nabatiye, the PLO's main base in the center, where the resistance was spotty because Palestinian regulars had run, no one really challenges the Israeli number of ten civilian dead. In a Nabatiye hospital with 60 patients, Dr. Kanon told me there was only one war-wounded, from

Sidon. All of this is a far cry from the "many thousands" assumed by Stephen S. Rosenfeld in the *Post* on June 18.

The refugee estimates have also been brought into perspective. Many of the refugees, in fact, are those returning to their homes in the south, abandoned after the PLO usurpations since 1976. The fact is that the invasion has solved or redressed a refugee problem even as it has created or perpetuated one. (Many of the returning refugees travel by Mercedes, the national automobile. Almost all of these cars are old, almost all of them scarred from the country's long years of fratricide. They are certainly not emblems of the rich; there may be more Mercedeses than cedars in Lebanon. The resilience of the Mercedes in these demanding surroundings suggests that German-manufactured goods outlast nature's most hardy creations.)

REPRESENTATIVES of Oxfam and other agencies are now all over Lebanon, trying to find a way to spend the money they've raised and are still raising. Some of them have gotten into squabbles with the Israelis over bureaucratic obstacles put in the way of distributing supplies. But the truth is that there is no emergency in basic human needs: food is plentiful and cheap. An uproar in Israel and abroad quickly rectified the tendency of both Israelis and Lebanese to ignore the Palestinians' suffering; in the few areas where electricity was still out there was a shortage of flashlights, many people said there was not enough gasoline or kerosene; one farmer told me that insecticide was scarce. The hospitals are, as one medical director put it, "not especially worse off than before"; *Médecins Sans Frontières* is operating freely but without as much to do as it had expected. Jacques Windfeld of the Save the Children Federation-England observed, "I've seen many developing countries where cities look worse normally. Lebanon is a developing country, isn't it?" "The one real need is for construction supplies to help people rebuild," the supervisor of the Joint Distribution Committee's operation in Lebanon told me. "But the need is not insurmountable and it is being addressed." There is already functioning a joint task force from the Israeli Army and the frail Lebanese government to do what's needed in the warm months ahead. Most people said to have been displaced were displaced for only a few days. One indication: David Ottaway reported on June 16 that Jezzín "is said to have become a major refugee center with 200,000 now camping in and around it." When I spent a day in Jezzín a week later they were not there. I don't think Ottaway would vouch for his numbers.

What is clear is that Israel's attack was measured and careful. I was also in Lebanon after "Operation Litani" in 1978, another Israeli action that was, in my view, neither measured nor careful. A slap-dash improvisation, it did not go as far north as this recent campaign and did not embroil big cities. But many villages and

towns I saw then were hit, bombed mostly, as nothing—not even the armed Palestinian center, Damour once and for centuries a Christian town—was hit this time. The inhabitants I saw then were enraged at the indiscriminate harshness of Israel's attack. The townspeople showed no deference to the victors then, no disposition to flatter. TNR noted in 1978 that,

air power and artillery were used in ways that turned civilians into targets, killing innocent people and driving thousands from their homes. . . . In some areas, the Israelis fought well indeed. . . . But mostly they used their fire power, the reflex of a modern army, in what can only be called an indiscriminate fashion. Fighting that way is neither necessary nor wise, and Israel was especially well prepared to fight differently. . . . The tactics Israel's army adopted were familiar and disheartening. And those tactics radically devalued what the army achieved

Nothing comparable could be said about the events of recent weeks. This time, Lebanese of all persuasions and origins have expressed—I heard it myself dozens of times—gratification at their liberation from the PLO.

It is by now certain that the casualties reported out of southern Lebanon were false. "Arabs exaggerate," said an Arab friend to me coyly in Jerusalem. But we need no instruction in national character to know about Palestinian hyperbole. The front page of *The Washington Post* on June 12 should have been an adequate object lesson. "Minutes before a ceasefire went into effect," Richard Homan reported, "Israeli bombers destroyed a Beirut apartment building housing the PLO's military command center. A PLO communiqué said more than 100 persons had been killed." Homan then went on to report what is probably closer to the truth: "Beirut radio put the toll at five dead." It's not hard to understand why the PLO, which attacks civilians as a strategy and as a chosen alternative to engaging armed units, is profligate with estimates of the dead caused by Israel: it's one way to try to establish a parity of immorality. On June 25, 1981, the Palestine Information Office published an advertisement in *The Christian Science Monitor* charging that "over 500 people in Palestinian refugee camps and Lebanese villages had been killed in the previous month by the Israeli military air raids and attacks." On July 7 the *Monitor* published a most unusual correction of a paid advertisement. It stated that 100, not 500, had been killed from May 25 to June 25, and "of these about 90 resulted from Syrian shelling, about 10 from Israeli attacks." The correction went on to note that, according to Lebanese sources, the total number killed since April 1 had been about 700. "The great majority of the losses resulted from shelling by Syrian forces. About 40 to 50 were the result of Israeli attacks." It is just possible, it may even be likely, that more civilians were killed in Lebanon by the Syrians alone—leaving aside the routine homicidal rampages of the various Palestinian factions and the Lebanese militias—in that virtually unnoticed fighting last spring than in this entire Is-

raeli war, which has riveted so many influential Americans to their seats of judgment. There is a certain promiscuity with zeroes in the Arab world.

III.

The relentless trolling of the PLO and its partisans about civilian casualties is directed at two audiences. With elite opinion in the West, it seems for the moment to have won a round. The other target is Israeli opinion, and, more particularly, the fighting spirit of Israel's citizen army.

Many Israeli soldiers with whom I spoke were desolated by the consequences of what they saw as their acts of necessity. They did not need the inflated casualty figures of "many thousands" to feel grief for what they had wrought. "We must be able to weep also for victims of just wars," said Yuval, a nineteen-year-old paratrooper in the elite Golani Brigade. (The Israelis ask that reporters not give last names in identifying ordinary soldiers. So here I willingly abide by the canons of their military censorship.) But Yuval went on to insist that army training establishes fastidious rules about avoiding harm to civilians in warfare. "I do not believe that we Israelis are wholly alone in the world in being so fixed on this issue. But I have no evidence that our neighbors care about it at all, and certainly not the PLO."

In English, the phrase is clumsily rendered as either the "purity of arms" or the "morality of arms." In Hebrew, the doctrine is called *tohar haneshek*; its origins go back to the 1930s, when, as a companion piece to *havlagah* or restraint, it established clear and self-denying rules of what was militarily permissible. Zionism then was an intensely ideological movement, measuring its successes against scrupulous moral standards. The semi-official Jewish self-defense force, the Haganah, insisted on so many prohibitions on exposing unarmed Arabs to risk that, as one old veteran told me, "we took on the most terrible risks ourselves." The

Haganah also got itself into an ongoing dispute with the far less meticulous and more indurated Revisionist wing of Zionism, Menachem Begin's precursors in British Mandate Palestine. In the post-independence Israel Defense Forces, the partisans of *tohar haneshek* went unchallenged. "Has the sway of the doctrine atrophied," I asked Shlomo Avineri, "with the ascendancy of the Revisionists?" Avineri is one of the world's leading political theorists, a specialist on Marx

who teaches at the Hebrew University, and director-general of the Foreign Ministry in the last Labor government. He is not a friend of the incumbents or their theories. (See, for example, the devastating treatment in his new book, *The Making of Modern Zionism* [Basic Books].) His answer was clear. "If anything, the restraints of the doctrine of *tohar haneshek* are more compelling now than before," he said. "The army's professionalism, which protects it, is sure. The lapses of Operation Litani have been corrected, strenuously. Moreover, precisely because the Likud is in power and the Labor opposition waiting to pounce on deviations from the army canons, there was much greater sensitivity, much more than ever before, to the fate of civilians during wartime. You know I believe in dialectics: under Begin and Sharon military instructions, the orders of war, from the bottom to

the top, were much more explicit with regard to *tohar haneshek*. The army did the maximum." What Avineri said to me was confirmed by virtually every soldier with whom I raised the matter.

Most of the soldiers I know, like most of the Israelis I know, are people of the left, all of them critics of this government, some of them critics of this war. Udi is one of them. I've known him for three years. Last fall I flew all the way from Boston to Jerusalem for his wedding. Udi is a reservist in field intelligence in the armored corps—made up of those infernal tanks which, once hit by heat-seeking weapons, don't give anyone half a chance to survive. In civilian life, he is a



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young therapist in training. He takes *tohar haneshek* seriously; he would do so even if there were no explicit doctrine. "The most awful moment of the war was when, searching through my binoculars for the source of RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] being hurled at our tanks, I found the faces of twelve- or thirteen-year-olds. What was I to do?" After the fighting was over, he suggested that just possibly they were somewhat older. Probably they weren't older; captured PLO recruitment documents say clearly, "those under 12 years of age will not be accepted" (*The New York Times*, July 11). So were these children civilian casualties? One of Udi's friends—I don't have his name in my notes—fought hand-to-hand in a refugee camp. Fire seemed to come from everywhere and could come from anywhere. Even in pursuit of terrorists, however, he wouldn't throw grenades into rooms where they might be hiding. He wouldn't understand a phrase like "generate no prisoners." Why, after all, does Israel now hold between 5,000 to 6,000 PLO prisoners from this Lebanon operation? There were six days of close combat in one of the camps. How many Israelis died there? Wouldn't fewer have died if the Israelis relied more on bombing?

Soldiers, like other Israelis, have political opinions and political differences. In contrast to most other armies, these are aired in routinely arranged seminars or bull sessions, even on the front. Such exchanges are part of army life. Professor Avineri, for example, was in Lebanon last week on a reserve assignment with the army education unit, and conducted "fully free and open" discussions with officers and ordinary soldiers on various vexing topics, including whether it would be right or wrong for Israel to move against West Beirut. "The army doesn't fear these discussions," he told me, "even though it knows that the officers who conduct them, being mostly intelligentsia, are mostly critics of the government or actually on the left."

THE ONLY BIG demonstration anywhere in the Middle East against the war in Lebanon was in Tel Aviv, organized by an army officer-initiated movement called Peace Now. But, as the very dovish Israeli novelist Amos Oz reminds us in the July 11 *New York Times Magazine*, "Not a single member of Peace Now disobeyed the mobilization orders. . . . Some of them died in the fighting." The first night I was in Israel I met a young Peace Now reservist who had volunteered to fight even though he hadn't been called up. "My unit goes, I go."

The dissent was mostly political or strategic, not moral. It was registered in advance of the war, and also during it. No one really disagreed with the goal of removing the PLO threat in the north; but some thought the costs too high or the goal impossible to achieve. It is a strange army, needing no home-front jingoism to support it; as a lieutenant I know said, "Except for some blatherings from the Prime Minister,

we heard no jingoistic slogans. It's better that way." A study done at Bar-Ilan University, released while I was in Israel, shows that, proportionally, more ex-members of the most left-wing of Israel's youth movements, the Hashomer Hatzair, join combat units in the army than from any other Zionist flank. Among soldiers such as these, whose political differences with the government are clearest, the greatest offense seems to have been taken at the charges of Israeli callousness or indifference to civilian casualties. "The false and hypocritical accusations coming from people who have been unfeeling about our civilian deaths and who speak in behalf of the people who aim only at civilians has caused a backlash," one Labor-affiliated journalist suggested. "Wars can be fought for purposes other than survival, for political purposes. Did the British fight the Falklands war for survival?"

IV.

Israel did not go to war against the PLO in Lebanon on behalf of the Lebanese people. Had it done so, its purpose might have been thought illegitimate. So if some alien rump had set up a state-within-a-state, as the PLO had done in southern Lebanon and Beirut since 1976, yet had not at all threatened Israel, there might have been laments in Jerusalem but little or no action from there.

And, of course, there are Israelis who didn't want action from Jerusalem, even if taken solely in Israel's interests. "I was one of them," said Clinton Bailey. "I was dead-set against this war." Bailey, 46, is a native of Buffalo, New York; he is now an Israeli. He is senior lecturer in Middle Eastern history at Tel Aviv University and now finds himself in Sidon, after a stint in Nabatiye, as adviser on Arab affairs to the Israeli military in southern Lebanon. He comes by this post because he is a prominent Arabist; he teaches courses on Palestinian nationalism and Bedouin culture. He's been a burr under the saddle of successive Israeli governments, having become a tribune for the nomadic Bedouins displaced by modernization in general and, specifically, by the air bases now being completed in the Negev to replace those evacuated in the Sinai. He knows the Arabs and likes them, and not in a patronizing way. A Lebanese municipal official in Nabatiye told me that Bailey was particularly sensitive to questions of Arab dignity, "which is why he made sure that the administration of the city was quickly given over to the Lebanese. We had not really had it for six years."

That's the story I was told by Lebanese all over southern Lebanon, in the big cities and the smaller towns, by Christians and Moslems, by people of all classes and educational levels. "I had thought that the PLO had fought for a foothold in Lebanon," Bailey told me. "Not till I came here and spoke to the Lebanese themselves did I realize what the PLO had done here, that they had established a stranglehold."

That is the great untold story of the last six years. It unfolds in every encounter with a Lebanese, even from those few still sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians. Everyone has his own grievance, his own memories. The simplest, perhaps the most existential, is that the PLO endangered everyone's lives by making southern Lebanon a target of the Israeli military. But it rarely stops with that. The PLO, it turns out, was not a guerrilla army in a friendly sea.

Khalil, a 25-year-old Moslem who had just left West Beirut, told me that his brother had been killed by a sniper shooting from a Palestinian stronghold. Jabber, slightly younger, said that his family's car had been confiscated by a PLO faction. Hussein said that his sister was constantly being accused of being an Israeli spy: "Not true, she resisted some Palestinian's advances." Ahmet said, "They got their way always by showing the pistol; if not the pistol, the Kalashnikov." Toufek—his brother called him Tommy—said, "This was our land and they ran it as if it were theirs." I heard similar complaints dozens of times.

MOUSTAF A MOUEIN was the representative of the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior in the Nabatiye district, including 42 surrounding villages. Nabatiye, I was told, was deserted over the years by much of its populace. "I walked on mines," Mouein said. "I could not hang the Lebanese flag in my office or the picture of the president." This civil servant described the disintegration of the courts. "An injured Lebanese could get no justice from a Palestinian. The courts were courts of force." He groped for words. A more articulate, more cagey official, Ednan Ibrahim, the town's deputy mayor, arrived. "There was no normal society in the south," he said, in elegant French. "Civil society was paralyzed. There were no functioning judges, no lawyers really. If a judge pronounced a fair decree, who would execute it? The police were the Palestinian militias." It was a tale of kangaroo courts, and of vengeance. This had a wider meaning he wanted to share. "There had not been a civil war between Moslem and Christian in Lebanon. There was a war on the land of Lebanon by two exterior forces to destroy the government and make the country their own. I mean the PLO and the Syrians. The PLO wanted to solve its problems on our territory."

I asked both of them whether Western journalists had asked them about life with the PLO during the previous six years. Both said no. One went further: "You couldn't talk to journalists without permission." Later, in the hallway, a minor functionary volunteered, "We were glad the journalists didn't come with their questions. We would have been afraid to tell the truth."

That the journalists didn't come with their questions is clear. (And it's not only in southern Lebanon where they demonstrated a startling absence of curiosity. How many stories do you remember out of Lebanon

about life in the Maronite and Druze areas of the north?) On four successive days in March 1981, *The Washington Post* ran articles, running to almost six pages, on "South Lebanon: The Forgotten War." The series, by William Claiborne and Jonathan Randal, is very tough on Major Haddad, the leader of an uneasy coalition between Shiites and Christians just north of the Israeli border, and tougher still on Israel. There is, for example, the suggestion that people left Nabatiye because of the Israelis rather than because of the PLO. "The Palestinians and their leftist allies exercise a kind of wild and woolly control," Claiborne and Randal wrote, "but they are hemmed in by the Syrian Army, which came to Lebanon as a peacekeeping force in 1976." How fortunate for the Lebanese that the PLO was hemmed in; but was the PLO really just wild and woolly? No, not exactly. In Shiite villages, "the Palestinians misbehaved, ruined orchards and crops, and the Israelis simply raised the pain threshold." Even today *Post* correspondents describe the PLO occupation in benign terms. Tyre "had been run by a local PLO commander in cooperation with local residents until the Israeli invasion." Some Lebanese, of course, did cooperate with the PLO, like the Jumblatt clan. (In Lebanon, extended families are political movements.) But is "cooperation" the word the residents of Tyre used? "Sidon had been a PLO protectorate. . . ." Perhaps a broad meaning of protection is intended here. Alas, it was not the war in southern Lebanon that was forgotten, but the people. That's what Deputy Mayor Ibrahim thinks: "Lebanon wasn't considered during the last six years." And then, with his dignity suddenly turning plaintive, "There is a Lebanese people."

BUT IT WAS from Beirut that the narrative of the Palestinian grievance was being written. From Beirut last week, Randal cavalierly reduced a complex historical dispute to a phrase: "... the Palestinians were expelled from Israel." Simple. It's also in Beirut where the PLO's dreams for redress are formulated and its heroes anointed. In the *Post* on July 7 Ed Cody eulogized PLO Colonel Azmeh Seghaiyer, apparently killed by the Israelis in Sidon. Azmeh "had participated in training and preparations for a number of operations against Israel including the coastal road assault of 1978 in which more than 30 Israelis were killed. . . . I always thought of him as an honorable military officer . . . you can admire a man even when he is part of deeds you cannot admire—the coastal raid, for example."

The PLO's behavior in the south does not quite fit the neat image its propagandists convey to the press. Confiscations, harassments, young people forced into the militias, schools closed, rapes, molestations, commandeering of licenses, passports, services, offices: this was the stuff of everyday life in the web of the PLO's "state-within-a-state." A doctor in the former PLO "protectorate" of Sidon reported that the PLO regularly

sacked hospitals and doctors' offices for medical supplies. "We couldn't keep our ambulances. The local population suffered." So much so that whole villages and towns were evacuated, sometimes leaving only the aged and the infirm. The Shiite village of Arnon, for example, in the far south, near Beaufort, or Rihane farther north.

I spent some time in others. Aichiye is one. It was a Maronite village of maybe 3,000 people, emptied save for 30, maybe 40, since shortly after a PLO massacre that took 75 lives. I have before me the names of comparable towns with comparable recent histories: Brih Kaa, Jdaidet Baalbeck, Kaddam. You've probably never heard of them. I hadn't till last month. There is a similar list of Lebanese towns shot up by the Syrians. No one pretends that the massacres were one-sided—Maronites shed the blood of Moslems, too, rivers of blood. Even Père Boulos Oneid, Aichiye's mayor-priest, admits that. But he still seemed stunned by the world's indifference, and even the Pope's, to the PLO's "rape of my native village. I am happy to be back. Ten or fifteen families return every day. Maybe with the grim lessons of the past behind us we will be able to live better with our neighbors."

IT WON'T be easy. When—and if—the foreigners leave, the local militias, manned by lithe young toughs, smiling and polite and probably trigger-happy, will still be around, armed with the hate-filled memories of old men. The Lebanese hatred of the Palestinian is something awful. The Hebrew paper *Ma'ariv* reported on July 9 that the motto of one xenophobic Maronite militia commands, "It is the duty of every Lebanese to kill one Palestinian." A blood-curdling *Times* interview on July 10 with two Christian poets left the Israeli colonel who'd accompanied correspondent Henry Kamm "so sick" that he "wanted to leave." Bailey told me, "You can't casually ask a Lebanese doctor to treat a Palestinian patient." It is a human tragedy.

But you can't begin to be able to deal with that tragedy until you look at the sources of the hatred—and the sources of the relief at the coming of the Israelis. Randal has found at least one Lebanese made happy by the war: "Dr. Labib Abu-Zahr... could scarcely conceal his joy. 'I'm a son of a millionaire orange grove owner... Now we want to build Lebanon again with marble floors,' he said, flourishing a cigar." But is it only Lebanon's vulgar rich who are relieved by the developments in their country? I met no one rich in Lebanon, and everyone I did meet was relieved that the Israelis had lifted from them the burden of the PLO. And not all that far from Damour, where wretchedness has been the fate sequentially of Christians and Palestinians, stands the glaringly plush little community of Doha. It must have been to the nicer parts of Beirut what Bel Air is to Beverly Hills, Hobe Sound to Palm Beach. Doha showed no scars of

war; its elegant homes and gardens are islands of corrupt indifference. Huge crates of granite and marble wait to be put into an unfinished house. War had intruded in Doha only when an Israeli general was killed by a PLO gunman in hiding. How had Doha, so close to ravaged Damour and other scenes of heavy fighting these last six years, remained unscathed? "The residents paid high taxes to the PLO and they provided a patrol," I was told by a less protected neighbor who lived nearby. So the PLO, a revolutionary movement of the downtrodden, not only confiscated from those with little but also cosseted those with much. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, longtime critics of Israel, wrote from Sidon in their syndicated column that for the Lebanese "surviving the PLO was another kind of hell." The PLO was "itself an occupying power," asserted the columnists. The character of PLO rule may just have been an augury of what was planned for the "secular democratic state in Palestine." Maybe that's why those who look forward to that state weren't eager to examine the model already taking form in Lebanon.

Doubtless if the Israelis don't extricate themselves from Lebanon, they will be seen as an occupying power, as they have become in the West Bank. For now, though, the contrast between the Israelis and the PLO in southern Lebanon is vivid and welcome, a manifestation also of *tolerance*. "Civilized soldiers," a schoolteacher called them. Do the Israelis loot, I asked? Toufek's sister—we were not introduced—answered from outside the circle of men, "Not a cigarette." But even well-behaved foreign soldiers around too long, will be seen as intruders. The West Bank is historically disputed territory. Southern Lebanon is not; there is no Palestinian claim to it whatever. So try to figure out why you've heard and seen and read so much about the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and so little about the Palestinian (and Syrian) occupations of southern Lebanon, two chunks of land roughly comparable in size and population, one on everyone's tongue, the other till last month the home of the forgotten Lebanese. Not eyeless in Gaza, but eyeless in Lebanon.

V.

Who, then, is doing the censoring? Not the Jews, but the journalists, think themselves the chosen people. At the Israeli Army spokesmen's headquarters in East Beirut, I heard one American reporter complain that the daily Israeli press briefing was inconveniently timed. Wars are to be fought for the benefit of the network news. A French journalist and a Japanese photographer, who'd not seen each other "since El Salvador," fell into each other's arms near Beaufort castle. "The Israelis are making it very hard," one of them said. What does "hard" mean? The networks have accused the Israeli authorities of "political censorship" because they've refused to transmit certain

film over satellite. I don't recall anything like those petulant outbursts when neither the British nor the Argentines allowed camera crews on to the Falklands. Everybody meekly accepted the official hand-outs.

Is Israel, at war with the PLO, really morally obliged as a democracy to transmit from its satellite in Tel Aviv ABC's interview with Arafat conducted in Beirut? The Israelis have also clamped down on other newsclips offensive to the censor or merely embarrassing. But this is probably the first war in history in which one side provided information services for the other. Must democracies, however, forswear engaging in psychological warfare and must they actually assist their enemies in this regard?

The uproar over Israeli censorship seems to me to be in part a projection. The press censored itself for years on Lebanon. It was not brave, but fearful—as it has been not brave but fearful at Hama in Syria or on the frontiers between Iraq and Iran, places where so many more were killed than in southern Lebanon.

VI.

I write from the safety of the seashore. The radio reports heavy casualties in Beirut, today in both parts of the city. Again, the death of innocents. Enough have been killed; no one needs the pornography of inflated numbers. West Beirut is the biggest hijacked plane in history; its population hostage of a vanquished army that has not even been asked to surrender but only to leave foreign territory with flag and song and small arms, for elsewhere, perhaps to those countries which have paid them all these years to operate out of poor Lebanon.

The radio also reports harsh repressive measures by Israel in the West Bank. These make a mockery of the victory in Lebanon which, with the PLO militarily defeated, makes it possible for Israel to take steps, however tentative and groping, toward a more generous peace. Israel is now itself hostage to Begin's ideological hubris, and to his will to be brutal. *Tohar haneshek* has run its course in the West Bank, and because of Israel's ruling politicians, not its army. The struggle in Israel, I console myself, is not over Lebanon, but over the West Bank, which is what the struggle should be about, the struggle to disgorge, the struggle to find Arab partners in a territorial compromise.

The Palestinians have always been hostage to the recalcitrance of their leaders. For sixty years a compromise was possible between the two peoples whose pasts and futures are inextricably tied to the one land of historic Palestine. But no compromise satisfied the Arab leadership—not even the tiny little statelets proposed for the Jews by the British in the 1930s, not even the partition plan of 1947. The PLO was formed, it is urgent to remember, in 1964, when the West Bank and Gaza and East Jerusalem were all still in Arab hands.

Always the Palestinians were hostage to the dream of a map without Israel. That's why the leadership never really permitted the mass resettlement of refugees anywhere. Their homelessness was to fester and explode; the camps were to be the launching pad for the "the return." UNRWA, initially a humanely motivated operation, became hostage to the refusal of the Arabs to find a compromise. It is shocking, but not illogical, that an UNRWA school in Sibliin should have served as a training base for PLO terrorists. When Camp David was ratified, committing the parties to negotiations for full autonomy and free elections that might eventually have developed, despite Begin's designs, into an Arab sovereignty, no West Bankers or Gazans came forward to press their case at the conference table. Some of their well-wishers never quite grasped why the Palestinian Arabs did not seize the opportunity provided by Camp David. But the Israelis understood, and rightly, that to the PLO and to those who feared it, any compromise was too compromising. And those who hinted they might want to come forward met with death at the hands of the PLO.

The Arabs of Palestine suborned their rights to the exiles in Lebanon, and the exiles chose armed struggle. The truly enormous caches of arms I saw, heavy arms, from the Soviet Union and North Korea and France and the U.S., were not being stockpiled for the social service organization which Jonathan Randai now says (*Washington Post*, July 8) is the real function of the PLO. All those weapons, far too many for those who would fight, held the Palestinians in thrall to the idea of some decisive defeat of the Israelis. It was the PLO which, having chosen armed struggle, inevitably provoked it, and was decisively defeated in it. Surrounded and isolated in Beirut, its fighters are hostage now to the idea of dying for Palestine. As in Sidon and Tyre, cities held hostage for six years, they don't care who dies with them, and their partisans don't really seem to care either.

LEBANON'S freedom to struggle through to its own complicated destiny depends on the removal of the PLO from Lebanese soil. So, too, only the removal of the PLO from Lebanon will free the Palestinians, there and in the West Bank, from their captivity to the intoxicating and death-dealing notion of no compromise. Those are the stakes in Beirut. (Understanding this, let us put an end to this silly fetish about 25 miles and 40 kilometers. Beirut, in any case, is only 33 miles from Israel's northern border.) What happens in the next days in Beirut, then, will determine whether the Palestinians will be allowed at long last to face reality. The Israelis have won their military victory; this surely is a precondition for peace. But it is not the only precondition; there are others, political ones. Whether the present Israeli government can move to create these remains to be seen. It, too, must face reality.

⑦ P.L.O

PLO terrorists are no boon to Blacks

15 — N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS / Sat. SEPTEMBER 11, 1982

CYNTHIA R. DARRISON

I agree with Jean Carey Bond (Aug. 14) that Afro-Americans would do well to ponder the relevance of events in Lebanon. She is right in saying that the time has come again for assertion of the Afro-American presence in the debate over the Middle East. I disagree with Ms. Bond, however, over her seemingly one-sided analysis of the situation and her hasty conclusion that the Black community should align its interests with the PLO and the Arab countries. The forum for opinion presented by The Amsterdam News is appreciated, especially in presenting all sides of an argument so that readers can more properly draw their own conclusions.

I strongly challenge Ms. Bond's suggestion as to which side the Black community should take in this debate. Are the PLO and the Arab countries really the friends of the Black community? I venture to say that it's not Israel's actions in this particular instance, per se, but who Ms. Bond calls "friend" that determined her opinion. It's logical to support the party you consider your friend, but first you have to decide who your friends really are.

It's wrong to jump to a few superficial parallels between the PLO and the American civil rights movement. This identification is based on a terrible perversion of the truth about the PLO. Unlike the civil rights movement, the PLO has never supported any form of nonviolent resistance, peaceful relations or political solutions. Instead, they advocate hatred and violence, exalting "the sword that kills" while rejecting Dr. Martin Luther King's "sword that heals." To cite similarities between the Black struggle and the PLO is to twist and ignore the facts.

In reality, the Arabs are not the friends of the Black community. Consider the financial condition of the Afro-American "community" "Petro-diplomacy," even when the bombs fall in West Beirut, does

not distinguish between the white imperialist and the Black laborer. Indeed not. When the Arab countries put an oil chokehold on the United States, Blacks were and are among the first to feel the pain. Rising oil costs are at the root of many problems faced by Afro-Americans today, including high unemployment and an ever increasing cost of living.

Additionally, what have the Arab promises of 1973 to the Black community amounted to? If Ms. Bond advocates trusting the Arabs with Afro-American friendship, she would do well to study how the Arabs treat their own brethren, as well as the world-wide Black community. In 1948, approximately 600,000 Arabs left Israel. Many were called to do so by an Arab-declared holy war against the Jews. Others fled when the Arab nations attacked Israel. And, equally important, since 1948, many Arabs have left Israel in search of hoped for shared Petrodollar wealth. Many of these refugees wandered for economic opportunity, leaving Israel for the oil-rich Arab countries. In reality, they would probably be better off in Israel. Arabs in Israel have a far higher standard of living than most other Arab refugees. They have equal voting rights and hold seats in Israel's Parliament. Arabic, like Hebrew, is the official language in Israel. There are 700 Arab educational institutions with more than 170,000 students. Every child under the age of 14, Arab and Jew, must go to school. The US State Department cited a 64 percent literacy rate among Israel's Arab population in 1981—"one of the highest in the Middle East." The gap between Israel's Jews and Arabs is more social and psychological—based mainly on a 34-year state of war called by the Arab nations—than economic or legal.

Arab slave market

Contrast the plight of the refugees in Arab countries. They are denied citizenship. They are a second-class group, forced to live in refugee camps. The

Arab governments care so little about their own people that they have allowed three generations of refugees to exist in these camps. In regard to the PLO, they were kicked out of Jordan in 1970. Syria attacked Palestinian camps in 1976. Iraqi agents declared war on the PLO a few years later. And we all know about the original silence of the Arab governments earlier in the Lebanon crisis.

If the Arabs don't take care of their own, what is to lead us to believe that they will take care of the Black community?

Take it one step further. How are Blacks

OPINION

treated in Arab countries? The Arabs, who ran the world's Black slave markets for centuries, still engage in the slave trade among themselves. Britain's Anti-Slavery Society notes that slavery was legal in much of the Arab world until 1962 and that it still exists in practice today. In late 1981, the Society accused the Arab League of maintaining "at least 100,000 slaves and 300,000 semi-slaves." And, we should not forget what has happened in Sudan. It is estimated that 500,000 to 600,000 non-Moslem Black Africans were slaughtered in a genocidal Arab war in 1959. The South Sudan Liberation Front has told the UN since 1962, one million Sudanese refugees have been killed and 300,000 refugees have fled to other countries.

Algeria gave Eldridge Cleaver haven in exile. He returned to the United States in 1975 and reported to 'The Boston Herald Examiner' in January, 1977, that "having lived intimately for several years amongst the Arabs, I know them to be amongst the most racist people on earth. This is particularly true of their attitude toward Black people. Many Arab families that can afford to keep one or two Black slaves to do their menial labor. Sometimes they own an entire family. I have seen such slaves with my own eyes."

In 1973, at the time of the Arab oil embargo, the Arab world used the intense pressure of real threats and empty promises to manipulate the African countries into severing ties with Israel. Despite this, Israel has continued a long history of friendly relations with the Black African countries, maintaining extensive informal relations. Close to 40 African countries, including every independent Black African country, have established a cooperation program with Israel, regardless of whether or not they maintain full diplomatic relations. Only Uganda has terminated its contacts with Israel, grabbing at the promises of lavish financial aid made by oil-rich Libya. Since 1958, Israel has been sending its experts to Africa and African trainees have been studying in Israel. Experts sent by Israel include specialists in agriculture, science and technology, construction and building, medicine and health, management and public service, cooperatives, education, youth organization, social work, community development, and other fields. The government of Israel and the Histadrut, the Israeli Federation of Labor, cosponsor the Afro-Asian Institute for Labor Studies and Cooperation, where Africans receive training in various aspects of labor organization and cooperative enterprise. Israel feels very strongly about the social and ethical significance of cooperation. Furthermore, in working together, the Africans and Israelis are partners in building new nations.

Inferior women

In her article, Ms. Bond cites Israel's treatment of Arab women. What she does not write is that in nine Arab countries, Arab women do not have the vote and are accorded a legal status and role inferior to men under the law. They are restricted in business and politics, as well as in family and social life. In direct contrast, Arab women in Israel enjoy a legal status equal to that of men, with legislation embodied in Israel's 1951 Equal Rights of Women Law. Women in Israel have equal status with men on matters of inheritance. Every woman over the age of 18 has the right to vote and be elected to public office. This provision has been extended to Arab

women on the West Bank.

Finally, I think it's important to examine the situation in Beirut. Bayard Rustin expressed an important idea in his Letter to the Editor in the July 13, 1982 New York Times. Along with three other members of Writers and Artists for Peace in the Middle East, Mr. Rustin wrote,

"We mourn the deaths of the many innocent civilians caught up in the present tragedy. But we have no tears for Arab governments and leaders who condone and encourage the stationing of terrorists along with their firing ranges and armories within civilian camps, schools, mosques, and residential areas, so that when the inevitable retaliation erupts, the loss of innocent lives can be exploited for propaganda purposes. The positioning of military personnel and equipment in such areas deserves the contempt of the civilized world, and appropriate international agencies should move to outlaw such cruel and cowardly tactics."

Yasir Arafat and the PLO have waged their so-called "legitimate struggle" with tactics of calculated violence, avoiding military targets and instead striking down women, children, athletes, diplomats, bus riders and airline passengers—the defenseless and uninvolved. It's a mockery of the truth to compare Menachem Begin's Irgun activity with that of Arafat's PLO. Since 1948, all Jewish Palestinian forces have sought to minimize civilian casualties by giving advance warning of attack—often at the risk of their own soldiers. The targets have been the British military and the enemy Arab military. How many other governments would have done as Israel did in Beirut?—sending planes over the city, within range of anti-craft artillery, to drop leaflets warning the civilian population to flee to the beaches to avoid attack. Perhaps if the PLO had not deliberately blocked the exit from the city, the civilian casualty toll might have been lower. Israel's first target in Lebanon was the PLO, not the civilians whose city and lives were invaded and destroyed by these Arab terrorists.

Destruction of Israel

The PLO's long-stated goal has been and is the total annihilation of the State of Israel. As they load jeeps and artillery onto the transport ships in the Beirut harbor, there is little to lead us to believe that their goal or activities will change. Their goal is clearly printed for all to see in their National Covenant and other documents. Yasir Arafat's recent statements mean little when you realize that he is scrambling to save his life and when you look at what he has said before. He is not a man to be trusted.

At a rally in Washington D.C. planned to coincide with Menachem Begin's June visit to President Reagan, and in support of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, Mayor Marion Barry made some very welcome and insightful comments. He told the crowd, "There is no way anyone could ever leave (Israel) after seeing the atrocities of 6 million people having been murdered and assassinated and killed, that you could come back without a strong sense that you had to do all you could to make sure that the Israelis and the people of Israel lived in peace and were secure at their borders."

The Washington Post of June 30, reported that Barry, who visited Israel in 1980, added, "I'm here to offer my strong support for making sure that happens. That in Lebanon you get a democratically elected and a free government. A government that believes in peace for itself and not war against Israel... and so I offer my support and the support of all the citizens of the District of Columbia, because myself, being a minority, I understand very clearly that if one of us is not free, (no one) is free."

The PLO's murdering and terrorist acts are not acts of "liberation." Their "cause" is not that of the Black community. The international hijacking and slaughter of innocent people does not bring us any closer to world peace. In embracing the PLO, Ms. Bond suggests that Afro-Americans embrace organized brutality and terrorism. Yes, the Afro-American community must assert its presence. But, first ponder the facts and decide who is the friend and who is not.

NEW YORK
Amsterdam News

The new Black view

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F.Y.I.

Ther
PLO
Pamphlet
RECEIVED OCT 11 1982

For
Your
Information

Pharise

Jerusalem, October, 1982

Dear Colleague,

The enclosed document is an unusual one. You ought to have been able to read it in Time, because the article was in fact commissioned by the editors of that magazine. Mr. Robert Slater, of Time's Jerusalem Bureau, approached Professor Ephraim E. Urbach, President of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, and asked him to write an article for Time on the situation in the wake of the tragic events in the Palestinian camps in Beirut, pointing out that generally writers from outside are not approached to write in their Essay section. Prof. Urbach, a world-renowned Talmudic scholar, and one of Israel's outstanding men of letters, after some hesitation, agreed. He was a little concerned lest the editing of the article might distort his ideas, but he was assured that after the editing he 'would have the last word.' The article was telexed to New York and after a short while Mr. Slater informed Prof. Urbach that Time would not, after all, be able to publish the article. Prof. Urbach said that he would publish it under other auspices.

Prof. Urbach has from time to time expressed his dissent against the Establishment, whether Labor or Likud, and he has acquired the reputation of being one of the most articulate of Israel's independent spokesmen. I am convinced that his words deserve to be widely circulated.

Sincerely yours,

Eli Eyal
Eli Eyal

Chairman, Department of Information

Ephraim E. Urbach

The Tragedy of Beirut and the Israel-Arab Conflict

The tragic events in the Palestinian camps in Beirut, about which the majority of the Israeli public learned only two days later, on Sunday, 19 September, aroused feelings of shock and outrage in Israel. Men and women of all strata of the population gave expression to their revulsion in demonstrations and protest gatherings, and in the media.

Although it was absolutely clear that Israeli soldiers were not directly involved in the murderous acts, questions were raised as to how such events could have happened when Israel Defence Forces were close to the scene, and whether sufficient measures had been taken to prevent the Phalangists from carrying out the massacre.

After my interview on Israel television, in which I called for a judicial commission of enquiry to find out all the facts, I received numerous calls of support. The same day the President of the State took the unusual step of asking the government to agree to the appointment of such a commission by the President of the High Court. Since then many public figures in Israel, including members of the coalition, have endorsed this call. As we already know, one minister has resigned and two members of the coalition voted against the government in the last session of the Knesset. The attitude of Israel's population is a clear expression of its moral reaction. The government was forced to concede that an official inquiry, if not a judicial commission, will be instituted. But this is not yet the last word. It seems that the coalition has already begun to founder over this issue.*

The concern of the Israeli people moreover stands out in extreme contrast to the subsequent political developments in Lebanon. For there it seems that the Lebanese have somehow been untouched by this terrible affair. The Phalangists took wholesale revenge upon the Palestinians, men, women and children, for the murder of their leader and president-elect Bashir Jemayel. Yet this bloody deed did not prevent the right-wing Muslims and left-wing groups, the declared protectors of the Palestinians, from electing Amin

* In the meantime such a commission has been established

Jemayel, the brother of Bashir, as president. Nobody in the Lebanon asked for the establishment of a commission of inquiry to find out the identity of the murderers among the Phalangists and to punish them.

This Orwellian situation is not new to those familiar with events in the recent past of the Middle East, like the butchery of the Palestinians at Tel ez Zaatar by the Phalangists in collaboration with the Syrians, the massacre of Christians in Zahle and Damour by the PLO, and the Black September ousting of the Palestinians from Jordan, followed by King Hussein's explanation that this was "a family affair."

Not much attention was then paid by world opinion to these atrocities, over which a veil was quickly drawn. Those responsible for the crimes continued in greater reverence at home and were treated abroad as honoured guests. But the recent events in Beirut have been seized upon by the media, and ugly conclusions concerning Israel's role were immediately voiced. Such reports were unaccompanied by accounts of the Israeli public's shocked reaction. The sudden awakening in many countries of human participation in grief over this even goes hand in hand with anti-Semitic assaults upon many Jews and a vicious anti-Israel propaganda.

Like many others in Israel, I was opposed to the advance of the IDF beyond the security zone of forty kilometres. But, paradoxically enough, one must fairly admit that world opinion only became aware after that advance of the immensity of the arms pile-up in Lebanon and the extent of its political precariousness. Lebanon had effectually ceased to be a state and had become an arena for condottieri whose militias were fighting each other.

It seems to me that the bare facts enumerated above underpin the singular position of Israel and its moral dilemma in the ambivalent crosscurrents of Middle East politics. They also serve to illuminate clearly the central issue of Arab-Israel relations and their misunderstanding by many people in the West. I am far from defending all the steps taken by the present government of Israel. But one must agree that this government for the sake of peace has taken upon itself to return to Egypt all the areas occupied in 1967, to evacuate the Sinai settlements and the Yamit salient. This decision caused a trauma for numerous people in Israel, who felt unable to place reliance upon Egyptian undertakings, and brought personal loss and upheaval to those who had settled there.

The government did this because Egypt declared itself ready to make peace with

Israel and to have normal relations with it. The negotiations went ahead even though many in Israel were aware of the dangers in the Arab ideology adhered to by Butrus Ghali, who played a crucial role in Egypt's initiative in 1977 and its implementation. This ideology (see, for instance, R.L. Nettler Encounter, June-July 1982, pp. 100 ff.) repeatedly expresses the view that the ultimate objective of a secular democratic Palestinian state in the whole of Palestine, as demanded by the PLO, is for the present unattainable. But this end will be realized in stages. These are predicted as follows:

1. Initial Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders. The creation of a Palestinian Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza.
2. The creation of a federated Palestine. This period would see the process of Zionist disintegration and collapse.
3. The creation of one unified Palestine. Here the final goal would be reached as the entity once known as Israel would disappear.

Notwithstanding this programme, reiterated in a frank statement in an address delivered by Dr. Mustafa Khalil, then deputy Egyptian prime minister, to a group of Israeli academics in Tel Aviv in 1980, Israel took the risk of giving up a valuable military asset in the hope that the realities of living in peace would create conditions which would outdate such ideologies.

Unfortunately the PLO have persisted in terror actions and the Arab states have not brought themselves to join Sadat's initiative, for which he had to pay with his life. Until now they have stubbornly refused to declare their readiness to recognize Israel and to enter into direct negotiations with it. The rejectionist Arab states, equally with Arafat and his PLO associates, hold to their covenant with its avowed aim of the elimination of Israel. Those in the Arab world more ready to compromise surround the issue with all kinds of evasions and ambiguities. In the West, politicians and public figures use microscopic lenses when examining Arab peace formulas acceptable to them in order to find a flicker of recognition of Israel in their proposals.

It is very difficult to ask the Jews in Israel to satisfy themselves with such elusive offers, even when presented by well-meaning people in the West, because they seem to lead inevitably to national suicide. The negative character of the Arab opposition to Israel makes it imperative not to deceive ourselves. The beginnings of the conflict

organized against the return of Jews to Palestine, go back to the anti-Jewish riots in Palestine in 1920, 1929 and 1936-1939. The war initiated by all the Arab states in 1948 was waged against the embryo Jewish state, while the offer to establish an Arab state by the UN in Palestine was rejected. The history of the last thirty-four years is one of continuous non-acceptance of Jewish statehood, pursued with violence and bloodshed. The main concern of the Arabs during this period has been to undermine the legitimacy of the existence of the state of Israel and destroy Zionism.

Notwithstanding our precarious situation and the atmosphere of hatred with which we are surrounded, I am fully convinced that an open approach by other leading Arabs, one, similar to that adopted by Sadat, would have gained a positive response from the people of Israel. The majority of Israelis place above any other considerations a feasible solution and normal relations with their Arab neighbours, combined with a readiness to recognize their national rights, even if such recognition would entail a calculable risk. The presentation of events in Israel by public figures and in the world media are counter-productive and often supply support to the more radical and uncompromising sectors of our population. I do not mean the condemnations of those observers who succumb to the Arab campaign of double talk, its allegations and slanders. I am more concerned about those who sit in judgement and express their horror that Israel is about to lose its moral soul! While they are fully entitled to criticise us and offer their frank opinions we expect them also to admit that we are fully entitled not always to accept them as fair, particularly when we find that they judge not only the Arabs but their own people by a considerably less stringent set of values.

The Zionist idea, from its inception, had a built-in moral vigour which brought about a new society founded on ideals of social justice. It inspired achievements in many fields, cultural, scientific economic, and of course also had its failures, struggles and anguish. Zionism had to withstand many assaults before the establishment of the state and suffer the consequences of the many wars after its establishment. But it has preserved its humanitarian ideals. The criticism and soulsearchings from within form part of its fabric. They are an inalienable inheritance, which many will watch over to ensure that under all circumstances this will remain so. Israelis will continue to struggle to uphold the rule proclaimed by the sage Hillel more than two thousand years ago: 'That which is hateful to you, do not unto others.' It must be applied in our dealings with Arab and Jew alike.

Jerusalem

September 24, 1982

THE MIDDLE EAST: MYTH AND REALITY

YOUTH INSTITUTE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Handwritten initials: "H" and "30"

CAN THIS MAN BRING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST?

He has met the Pope, spoken with European leaders, been the recipient of state dinners in the Soviet Union, and addressed the United Nations. In recent interviews with Western journalists, he and his advisors have sounded moderate calls for solving the "Palestinian problem." But who is the real Yassir Arafat and what does his Palestine Liberation Organization stand for?

- The slaughter of 18 Israeli children by a hand grenade thrown into a classroom of a school in Maalot, Israel.
- The murder of 26 pilgrims at Lod Airport who were visiting Israel from around the world.
- The killing of 36 tourists travelling by bus on Israel's coastal road.

The goal of Yassir Arafat and the PLO is clearly and unequivocally stated in the PLO Covenant — their equivalent to the Constitution of the United States.

ARTICLE 19: "The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal."

The PLO rejects the

1947 U.N. decision which resolved the claims of the Zionist movement and the Arabs with a compromise for two recognized states.

ARTICLE 21: "The Arab Palestinian people . . . reject all solutions which are substitutions for the total liberation of Palestine."

Adopted in 1968, the Covenant has been reaffirmed by every Congress of the PLO since then. At the last Congress in 1981, a resolution stated that Arafat's organization within the umbrella PLO "**Fatah is a national, revolutionary movement whose aim is to liberate Palestine and**



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to liquidate the Zionist entity politically, economically, militarily, culturally, and ideologically."

When anyone asks Arafat about this fact, as in a "60 Minutes" interview recently, Arafat insists that the question is "unfair."

The PLO Covenant would mean little if it were not for the means

that the PLO adopts to achieve its ends. "**Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine It is an overall strategy and not merely a tactical phase,**" states Article 9 of the Covenant. And Article 10 asserts: "Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war."

Is it possible for such a group, committed to the destruction of Israel and its inhabitants, to make a sincere contribution to peace in the Middle East? A just and fair solution must be found to the plight of the Palestinian people. But it cannot be found through the PLO, which continues to adhere to a Covenant that can be fulfilled only through violence, terror and bloodshed.

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
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Organizations listed for identification purposes only



United Press International
P.L.O. leader Yasir Arafat (left) with King Hussein in Amman last weekend.

For P.L.O., a 1st-Class Trip To Nowhere?

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

AMMAN, Jordan — At the end of a news conference by the Palestine Liberation Organization last week, reporters cornered its top military commander, Khalil al-Wazir, and pounded him with questions about why the P.L.O. would not give Jordan a mandate at least to explore what could be gained from the Reagan peace initiative. Growing increasingly exasperated, the commander finally shot back, "What is in it for the P.L.O.?"

It was a revealing moment. There is virtually nothing in the Reagan plan for the P.L.O. as an institution. The plan proposes the establishment of a self-governing Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza strip linked with Jordan, but assigns no role to the P.L.O. as long as it refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist. Negotiations for the Arab side would be conducted by Jordan and a delegation of non-P.L.O. Palestinians. But while the American initiative holds out little for the P.L.O. itself, it offers a great deal to West Bank Palestinians who hope to rule themselves and avoid having their land absorbed into the Jewish state. The P.L.O.'s refusal last week to give King Hussein any kind of green light on the Reagan plan raises the question, as one Jordanian cabinet minister put it, "whether the P.L.O. isn't more interested in preserving itself rather than part of Palestine."

At any rate, P.L.O. chairman Yasir Arafat underscored his differences with Hussein last week by going to Kuwait to confer, then delaying his scheduled return to Amman to complete his discussions with the King.

After Saudi Arabia, the P.L.O. is probably the most overrated political actor in the Middle East. The P.L.O.'s presence in Beirut for 13 years — where it enjoyed a wide and often uncritical exposure to a large diplomatic community and an international press corps — helped it assume an image that was often larger than life. This image tended to obscure the P.L.O.'s own internal weaknesses and the rather limited quality of its leadership. The Israeli invasion last summer dispelled the myth of the P.L.O. as a guerrilla power and events since the summer have begun to raise questions about it as a political institution as well.

The fact that the organization had an independent base of operations in Lebanon enabled Mr. Arafat to avoid making some of the toughest decisions. When the diplomatic options were not to Mr. Arafat's liking he could always go back to Beirut and say he was going to pursue the armed struggle. Because he controlled a piece of strategically located ground no one could ignore him for long. One day Mr. Arafat would hint at recognizing Israel and the next he would talk of destroying it. But at no time did he lay down a realistic strategy for doing either. His was a game of endless maneuvers.

Two Choices for Arafat

Having lost Lebanon, Mr. Arafat is now in a much more difficult position. He no longer has a tree house to climb into when the diplomatic heat is on. The Israelis have virtually removed any serious P.L.O. option for "armed struggle" and the quickening pace of Israeli settlement-building in the West Bank has made it imperative for the Palestinians, and the Jordanians, to work out a credible diplomatic formula that will preserve the land for Arab sovereignty before there is no land left.

In these circumstances, the old P.L.O. seems finished. Mr. Arafat now appears to have two choices. He can take a clear-cut political decision to negotiate with Israel or mandate Jordan to do so, accepting that this would split his organization. Or he can continue to live in an airplane, fly around on state visits to the 100-odd countries that recognize the P.L.O. and watch as his organization gradually becomes politically irrelevant.

Mr. Arafat has indicated to King Hussein in private that he would very much like to get involved in the negotiating process. His problem is that he can't pay the entry fee — recognition of Israel or authorization of Jordan to speak on his organization's behalf — unless he has some guarantee, not only that Israel will halt its settlement activity, but that the Palestinians will get land back. Israel has not made it any easier for Mr. Arafat by rejecting the Reagan initiative and opposing a freeze on settlements.

Washington has recognized the problem. Hence President Reagan's promise to Hussein last week that in return for his joining the proposed negotiations, the United States would seek to bring about a halt in Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Mr. Arafat might have had a lot more room to maneuver at this time had he crushed the extremists within his organization when he had them under his thumb in Beirut. Even his colleagues will admit that Mr. Arafat, unlike other successful revolutionary leaders, has never really faced down the radicals in his organization. As a result, the P.L.O. today is a hodgepodge of pro-Syrian, pro-Iraqi, pro-Libyan and pro-Arafat factions, all of whom the leader has to poll before he can make a decision.

"Because the P.L.O. is now so dispersed and loaded down with internal contradictions, it can't agree on anything that falls short of 100 percent of its objectives," a European diplomat said. "But the P.L.O. simply is not in a position to be demanding 100 percent from anyone."

Rather than make any decision that could split the organization or deprive it of a central role in any peace negotiations, the leadership appears to prefer to postpone matters and hope that somehow conditions will change to its advantage. In the meantime, the bureaucracy seems likely to survive. The corporate instinct of the leadership should not be underestimated. It has become a way of life for hundreds of men. There are offices to go to, lots of conferences to attend around the world and an endless stream of internal meetings to take part in. The pay isn't bad and for senior officials there is always a Mercedes.

Somewhere along the way, a Western diplomat in Amman remarked, the P.L.O. seems to have become so involved with the "revolution" and the "cause" that it has lost touch with the reality on the ground. After every Arab-Israeli war, it decides that it might be ready to accept what it could have had before the hostilities began, but which may be impossible now.

"It all reminds me of one of those characters out of a Dickens novel, who is pursuing a case through the civil courts for 30 years," remarked the diplomat. "The legal case becomes everything and he forgets that he could have settled it out of court and been back to work a long time ago. The P.L.O. is so obsessed with the revolution with a capital 'R' that it has forgotten about the land with a capital 'L.'"

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CONSULATE GENERAL
OF ISRAEL IN NEW YORK
INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

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FOR YOUR INFORMATION

THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THE P.L.O.

THE P.L.O. REPRESENTATIVE IN SAUDI ARABIA, RAFIK EL-NATSHE, DECLARED ON JULY 9, 1983 THAT HE HAS RECEIVED ADDITIONAL AID FOR THE FATAH ORGANIZATION FROM KING FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA. THE ADDITIONAL FUNDS WERE GIVEN IN APPRECIATION OF THE ORGANIZATION'S ENDEAVORS. NATSHE POINTED OUT THAT THIS ADDITIONAL ALLOCATION WAS A SUPPLEMENT TO A GRANT OF \$28.5 MILLION GIVEN A FEW DAYS EARLIER. THE SAUDI AID IS BUT ONE OF THE MANY AND VARIED FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THE P.L.O.

Since its establishment in 1964, the P.L.O. has devoted much time and effort to securing a financial base for its operations. The "National Palestinian Fund," also established in 1964, is in charge of the financial aspects of the P.L.O., i.e., the procurement of funds, the budgeting of P.L.O. operations and the management of the organization's finances and properties.

The composition of P.L.O. financial resources has fluctuated during the 19 years since its establishment. However the main contributors have always been the conservative oil-producing countries on the one hand and radical Arab elements on the other.

The Arab Summit in Baghdad in 1978 decided to establish a permanent framework for Arab aid to the P.L.O. and other confrontation states. The "Baghdad Aid" is supposed to be given as a grant on a yearly basis, from 1979 to 1988. The aid amounts to \$400 million

yearly and is transferred to the P.L.O. in three channels:

- A. Direct aid - \$250 million yearly;
- B. Aid to the steadfastness of the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria, through the joint Jordanian-P.L.O. committee - \$100 million yearly;
- C. Aid to the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria, through the P.L.O. - \$50 million yearly.

The financiers of the "Baghdad Aid" are Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Iraq, U.A.E., Algeria and Qatar. Algeria and Libya have not fulfilled their obligations under this agreement, and Iraq stopped her contributions in 1982 due to financial difficulties arising from the Iran-Iraq war. In spite of this, \$250 million are transferred annually to the P.L.O.

LIBYA DOES NOT GIVE AID WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE BAGHDAD AID. HOWEVER, LIBYA GIVES \$50 - 100 MILLION OF DIRECT AID YEARLY TO THE MOST EXTREME PALESTINIAN TERROR ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE P.L.O. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT LIBYA ALLOTS "BONUSES" TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOR COMPLETION OF SUCCESSFUL TERROR OPERATIONS. THE ARAB AID ILLUSTRATES THE VARIOUS ARAB COUNTRIES' INVOLVEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION'S ACTIVITIES.

SINCE THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT, SAUDI ARABIA HAS SUPPLIED THE P.L.O. WITH OVER \$400 MILLION OF AID, AND IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE P.L.O.'S STAUCHEST FINANCIAL UNDERWRITER. THUS KHALED EL KHASSAN, MEMBER OF THE P.L.O.'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DECLARED ALREADY IN 1979:

"Saudi grants the most substantial assistance to the Palestinian revolution and is the most ardent supporter of the return of the Palestinians to their homes and occupied lands."

Some countries finance their own proxy Palestinian organizations (Iraq - The Arab Liberation Front; Syria - the Saiqa; and Libya - the Fronts of Habash, Hawatma and Jibril). The recent revolt has created

an even stranger situation: Saudi Arabia gave the Fatah a special grant in July, 1983 while Libya is financing the rebels and, according to various sources, is said to have given them at least \$10 million.

The large income from Arab aid has enabled the P.L.O. to develop independent sources of revenue. Among these are:

- A. Revenues from hashish trade - The P.L.O. control over some of Lebanon's export avenues, and its covert international infrastructure have allowed the organization to deal successfully in Lebanese hashish.
- B. Interest on deposits in private banks - The income of the P.L.O. greatly exceeds the needs of a terrorist organization, which does not maintain a national economy. As a result of this, the P.L.O. has amassed large reserves of capital in private banks. The extent of the reserves is not known. Assuming the sum is only one billion dollars, this still assures the P.L.O. of a regular yearly income of \$80 - 100 million from interest payments.
- C. Industry - The P.L.O.'s control of certain parts of Lebanon coupled with its capital reserves, have allowed it to establish an economic empire which encompasses many industrial and commercial corporations. The P.L.O.'s main economic concern - "Zamed" encompasses about 30 companies, which employed over 5,500 workers on the eve of Operation Peace for Galilee.

The other terrorist organizations also have their own economic enterprises. Thus, the Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine (of George Habash) ran, in Southern Lebanon, the country's largest marketer of iron.

D. Control of Lebanese Ports - As the P.L.O.'s hold on Lebanon grew stronger, it seized vital commercial intersections and used them to raise taxes. Thus the P.L.O. collected port taxes in Tyre, Sidon and still collects them in Tripoli.

E. Other sources of revenue for the P.L.O. - are brokerage fees from arms and oil transactions and the training of foreign terrorists in the P.L.O.'s camps. In the past even plane hijackings were utilized to raise money.

The management of the P.L.O.'s financial empire is in the hands of the Palestinian National Fund. There is criticism in the Palestinian camp over the management of the fund. The criticism centers on charges of corruption, mismanagement, and unjust allocation of funds. (Even Yasser Arafat is accused of holding secret private bank accounts.)

OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE CAUSED SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE P.L.O.'S INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF REVENUE BY CUTTING THE ORGANIZATION'S LINKS TO AREAS SOUTH OF BEIRUT. THE P.L.O. ITSELF ESTIMATES THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE AT \$350 - 400 MILLION. HOWEVER, INCREASED AID FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD HAS DONE MUCH TO MINIMIZE THE ECONOMIC DAMAGE. THE P.L.O.'S LARGE CAPITAL RESERVES AND ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF REVENUE STILL ENSURE IT A CONSTANT INCOME GREATLY EXCEEDING ITS EXPENDITURES.